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I came to explore the wreck.
The words are purposes.
The words are maps.
I came to see the damage that was done
and the treasures that prevail.
I stroke the beam of my lamp
slowly along the flank
of something more permanent than fish or weed
the thing I came for:
the wreck and not the story of the wreck
the thing itself and not the myth .... 1
INTRODUCTION
We live in a world of culturally constructed myths.2 We are
their authors, their audience, their heroines and villains. These
myths defy easy characterization: they enlighten and obscure, reveal
and construct reality, reflect and refract unacknowledged assump-
tions and prejudices. Because they are comprised of truth and fic-
tion, myths may be simultaneously accurate and deceptive.3 Myths
are constant-generations subscribe to the same myths-and yet
protean, able to adapt to changes in knowledge and social senti-
ment.4 Our perspective on a myth will influence the meaning we
ascribe to it and the use to which it is put.
Judges and legislators, as cultural participants, are privy to
and rely upon myths, consciously and unconsciously, to understand
and persuade. As influential public actors, they are in a unique
social position to enforce myths. The powerful role myths play in
shaping legal outcomes has been evident in the recent judicial and
1. ADRIENNE RICH, Diving Into the Wreck, in ADRIENNE RIcH'S POETRY 65, 67
(Barbara Charlesworth Gelpi & Albert Gelpi eds., 1975).
2. Myths are inscribed by and in each of us, permeate our thoughts and infuse all
human institutions. Pierre Maranda quotes Levi-Strauss: "Les mythes se pensent dans
lea hommes'" and explains: "That is, we are thought out by the semantic structures that
charter us. The traditions in which our lives are embedded 'think themselves out,' i.e., un-
fold and display their semantic resources through the people they traverse, and who per-
petuate these traditions over time." Pierre Maranda, The Dialectic of Metaphor: An
Anthropological Essay on Hermeneutics, in THE READER IN THE TEXT 183, 184 (Susan R.
Suleiman & Inge Crosman eds., 1980).
3. "Depending on the vantage point, myths are simultaneously true and fictional."
Jane Ruthei-ford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1992). "D1lyths
frequently combine facts and fantasy, and gradually change over time. Myths are living
creations of a culture, and viewed from within the culture, they represent core values that
some may also view as central truths." Id. at 3-4.
4. "Myths are stories that are distinguished by a high degree of constancy in their
narrative core and by an equally pronounced capacity for marginal variation." HANS
BLUMENHURG, WORK ON MYi 34 (Robert M. Wallace trans., 1985).
MOTHER IBODY MYTH
legislative use of Norplant,5 a long-acting contraceptive device that
is surgically implanted in a woman's arm.
The Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) approval of
Norplant for distribution in the United States on December 10,
19906 met with immediate reaction from the public, judges and legis-
lators. On December 12, The Philadelphia Inquirer published an
editorial with the headline, Poverty and Norplant-Can Contracep-
tion Reduce the Underclass?, suggesting that African-American
women on welfare be implanted with Norplant to reduce the welfare
burden.7 Within three weeks of FDA approval, a California judge
directed an African-American woman on welfare who pled guilty to
child abuse to undergo Norplant implantation as a condition of pro-
bation. Within six weeks, a state legislator introduced two bills
focusing on Norplant. The first authorized the payment of cash in-
centives to women on welfare who would agree to implantation with
Norplant,9 and the second proposed mandatory Norplant implanta-
tion of women convicted of certain drug-related offenses. 10 Other
judges and legislators have followed suit with similar measures,"
and currently all fifty states and the District of Columbia fund
Norplant through their Medicaid programs. 12
To understand the judiciary's and legislature's swift enlistment
of Norplant for use in the welfare and criminal contexts,"3 this
5. For a description of the Norplant device, see infra notes 164-77 and accompanying
text.
6. Long-Term Contraceptive Approved, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Food Drug
Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) 42,180 (Dec. 26, 1990).
7. Poverty and Norplant-Can Contraception Reduce the Underclass?, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Dec. 12, 1990, at A18. The public outcry was such that the newspaper printed
an apology. Tamar Lewin, Implanted Birth Control Device Renews Debate over Forced
Contraception, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1991, at A20.
8. People v. Johnson, No. 29390 (Cal. Super. Ct. Tulare County 1990). See infra notes
219-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of Johnson.
9. Kan. H.B. 2089, 74th Leg., 2d Sess. (1991); David S. Coale, Note, Norplant
Bonuses and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 71 TEX. L. REV. 189, 195-96 n.40
(1992) (citing Kerry Patrick, Poor Women and Society Benefit by Linking Norplant,
Welfare Aid, WICHITA EAGLE, Mar. 4, 1991, at 11A).
10. Kan. H.B. 2255, 74th Leg., 2d Sess. (1991); Coale, supra note 9, at 195-96 n.40.
11. See infra notes 288-301 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative
initiatives and infra notes 186-217 and accompanying text for judicial enlistment of
Norplant.
12. Birth Control Implant Gains Among Poor Under Medicaid, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,
1992, at Al [hereinafter Implant Gains Among Poor].
13. Dr. George Annas, Director of the program on law, medicine and ethics at the
Boston University School of Medicine, remarked at the speed with which judges and legis-
lators have gravitated towards Norplant: "I think we're going to see more of these cases.
It's kind of amazing that this has happened already, when hardly any physicians even
know how to implant this thing.'" Lewin, supra note 7, at A20 (quoting Dr. George
Annas). One commentator remarked at how rapidly Washington's Department of Social
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Comment examines the myths that inspire the Norplant measures14
and considers the process by which judges and legislators weave
myths into the law. 5 This Comment focuses on the legal invocation
of the "mother/body" myth-the notion that women's conduct can be
explained by and controlled through their reproductive capacity,
their maternal bodies."
Scholarly discussion of Norplant measures has addressed their
legal implications, 7 and much of the popular debate has concen-
and Health Services made Norplant available to welfare mothers: "The two months from
FDA approval to DHHS' picking up the tab is the fastest the ponderous agency has moved
on anything in recent memory." Don Williamson, Norplant: Forced Surgery is no Answer,
SEATrLE TIMES, June 27, 1991, at A12, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, SEATTM File.
14. This Comment will use "Norplant measures" to refer collectively to judicial and
legislative action involving Norplant.
15. Judges and legislators are faced with myriad moral-social-legal decision-making
dilemmas. While I am critical of the thinking behind remedial efforts which target
women's reproduction, I recognize that public officials, faced with exceedingly difficult
situations, are most likely acting in good faith. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Birth Control as
Penalty for Child Abuse, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 1988, § 2, at 8 (noting the difficult issues
posed in such cases). Many proponents of the Norplant measures are responding to the
real problems of drug dependent infants, drug dependent mothers and welfare dependent
families. See, e.g., Leon A. Espinoza et al., They Made a Difference-Ordinary Citizens
Accomplish Extraordinary Feats to Leave Their Mark on 1991, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 18,
1991, at F1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, SEATTM File (commending two women
for their work with infants born to drug-addicted mothers. These women believe that
drug-addicted mothers who give birth to several drug-affected children should be
implanted with Norplant if necessary.); Lewin, supra note 7, at A20 (quoting Dr. George
Annas of Boston University) ("'A lot of people have given up on social policy, on taking
care of poor women, and there is an increasing undercurrent that since we don't know
what to do about crack addicts, people with AIDS and child abusers, we should stop them
from having kids.").
Judges are also frustrated with traditional, seemingly ineffective sanctions.
Unusually Creative Judges Now Believe Some Punishments Can Fit the Times, CHI. TRIB.,
July 3, 1988, § 3, at 1, 7 [hereinafter Creative Judges] ("'[Judges] are looking for creative
and meaningful ways to both stop crime and offenders, yet do something along the order
of rehabilitation!") (quoting Herbert Hoelter, Director of the National Center on
Institutions and Alternatives); see Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture and American
Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1885 (1991) ("[D]issatisfaction with the primary
punishment options has led to experimental, creative sanctions and probation conditions,
which include the 'shaming and shunning' practices.").
16. See infra part I for a discussion of the mother/body myth.
17. The largest part of the debate over the possible and appropriate uses for
Norplant has occurred in the media in the form of articles and editorials, but legal
scholars have also joined the fray. For legal literature addressing Norplant, see Stacey L.
Arthur, The Norplant Prescription: Birth Control, Woman Control, or Crime Control? 40
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 (1992); Michael T. Flannery, Norplant: The New Scarlet Letter?, 8 J,
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 201 (1992); Julie Mertus & Simon Heller, Norplant Meets
the New Eugenicists: The Impermissibility of Coerced Contraception, 11 ST. LOUIS U. PUB.
L. REv. 359 (1992); Thomas E. Bartrum, Note, Birth Control as a Condition of
Probation-A New Weapon in the War Against Child Abuse, 80 KY. L.J. 1037 (1992);
Coale, supra note 9; Jim Persels, Note, The Norplant Condition: Protecting the Unborn or
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trated on arguments "for" or "against" the measures. 8 I hope to add
to these discussions by taking a different approach.'9 Part I of this
Comment introduces the mother/body myth by briefly exploring the
origins of the view that a woman's behavior can be understood and
regulated with virtually exclusive reference to her procreative capac-
ity. It highlights rhetoric and images that signal this myth's pres-
ence.
Part H traces the development of the mother/body myth in
three contexts: Section H.A illustrates the presence of the moth-
er/body myth in the context of the involuntary sterilization of wom-
en, Section l.B illustrates the presence of this myth in the context
of court-ordered contraception for criminal defendants, and Section
H.C discusses the cases and laws which have enlisted Norplant.
Part II highlights the similarities that unite these contexts, exam-
ines the factors that seem to catalyze the invocation of myth, and
explicates the process by which myths are inscribed in law.
Part III concentrates on the bases for the myths around which
Violating Fundamental Rights?, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 237 (1992); Elyse R. Rosenblum,
Comment, The Irony of Norplant, 1 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 275 (1992); Charlotte
Rutherford, Reproductive Freedoms & African American Women, 4 YALE J. L. &
FEMINIsM 259, 261-62 (1992); See also Requirements or Incentives by Government for the
Use of Long-Acting Contraceptives, 267 JAMA 1818 (1992) (American Medical Association,
Board of Trustees Report) [hereinafter Long-Acting Contraceptives].
A notable work written from the public health perspective is DIMENSIONS OF NEW
CONTRACEPTIVEs: NORPLANTAND POOR WOMEN (Sarah E. Samuels & Mark D. Smith eds.,
1992) (a collection of papers presented at a Forum hosted by the Kaiser Family
Foundation in November, 1991 and published by Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation)
[hereinafter NORPLANT AND POOR WOMiEN].
18. See, for example, the following editorials and letters to the editor: Walter A.
Graham, Norplant Can Aid Mothers, USA TODAY, Feb. 16, 1993, at 10A; Compelling the
Use of Contraceptives, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1993, at A18; Only Abstinence Will Put End
to Teen Pregnancy, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 23, 1992, at A15, available in DIALOG,
ATLANTA-JC File; Norplant Debate-How Can Eliminating one Problem Add to
Another?, SEATTLE TIMES, July 31, 1991, at AS, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
SEA TTM File; Drug-Addicted Moms-Norplant Would Enable us to Keep Denying the
Real Problems, SEATTLE TIMES, July 16, 1991, at A7, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
SEATTM File; Welcome Contrast on Birth Control; Gov. Wilson's Contraceptive Plan has
Risks, But It's a Start, L.A. TIIES, May 20, 1991, at B4; Judge Orders Birth Control for
Abusive Mother, L.A. TIMIES, Jan. 30, 1991, at B6.
19. I do have a bias against the Norplant measures insofar as they represent State
efforts to discourage certain women from reproducing. Yet I have not chosen my approach
to this subject because of my inclination to oppose the Norplant measures. Rather, my
approach reflects a different way of thinking about the Norplant measures than
traditional argument or resort to legal doctrine. In part, this is because neither the legal
doctrine which might protect probationers, nor the various arguments which might
protect recipients of entitlements, are very useful in grappling with the larger issues the
Norplant measures raise. I attempt to rethink the issues raised by the Norplant
measures, and to consider also what the proliferation of these measures say about how we
think.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the Norplant measures are built. It also shows how the Norplant
device and its uses perpetuate the myth that women can and should
be controlled by their bodies. Part H asserts that the myths that
underlie the Norplant measures influence and reinforce claims
about women's relationship to their reproductive capacities, and
that these myths are perceived as justifying the imposition of the
Norplant measures themselves. For, it is suggested, the Norplant
measures justify their own existence by creating and perpetuating
the conditions which allegedly warrant their imposition. Part HI
concludes by examining the costs of the Norplant measures for
women's bodies and for judicial and legislative analysis.
While acknowledging the difficulty involved in identifying and
decoding myths, this Comment advocates that our use of them be-
come more thoughtful and conscious. We determine the role of myth
in our lives. We can thoughtlessly repeat myths, preserving them, or
we can try to understand them and ourselves in relation to them.
This Comment's goal is to make explicit what judges and legislators
have left implicit, to say out loud what has been left for us-their
audience-to silently and complicity insert. In so doing my hope is to
encourage a discussion of how the legal system might become more
reflective about and accountable for its role in perpetuating myths.
I. THE MOTHER/BODY MYTH
[The] linkage of the concepts 'women-bodies-nature' which operatets] to
deny women's responsibility (they can't help it) whilst ironically discovering
them to be culpable (they bring it on themselves), remains a powerful
element in the construction of women as legal subjects.20
Numerous cultures over many centuries have mythologized
mothers.' A woman's potential for motherhood has been perceived
and treated as the defining characteristic of her existence, 2 causing
women's child-bearing capacity to assume an exaggerated central-
20. CAROL SMART, FEIfmNISM AND THE POWER OF LAW 96 (1989). Sherry Ortner also
observes that women have been seen as "closer to nature" because of their bodies-their
reproductive capacities. Sherry B. Ortner, Is Female to Male as Nature is to Culture, in
WOMAN CULTURE & SOCIETY 67, 73 (Michelle Rosaldo & Louise Lamphere eds., 1974).
21. See generally EDWIN 0. JAMES, THE CULT OF THE MOTHER-GODDESS (1961) (cross-
cultural studies of myths about mothers); ERICH NEUMANN, THE GREAT MOTHER (1955)
(same); JAMES J. PRESTON, MOTHER WORsmP: THEME AND VARIATIONS (1982) (same). See
also WOLFGANG LEDERER, FEAR OF WOMEN (1968) (reviewing changing societal percep-
tions of women from ancient times through the twentieth century).
22. "Woman's status as childbearer has been made into a major fact of her life."
ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN xiii (1976); JEANNE M. STELLMAN, WOMEN'S WORK,
WOMEN'S HEALTH, MYTHS AND REALITIES 179 (1977) (identifying the "perpetual preg-
nancy myth"-that is, the assumption that "because a woman can bear children... she
will bear children.").
708 [Vol. 41
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ity.2 Woman-mother-body has been linked in thought and under-
standing. Women's bodies have been thought to reflect aspects of
their conduct and temperament,2' and that conduct and tempera-
ment has in turn been understood as derived from their bodies, par-
ticularly with regard to reproductive matters.2 Women have been
seen as "naturally" unstable, 6 irrational, 7 hysterical, 3 unreliable 9
and lacking in self-control. 0 Women have been viewed, in short, as
"the product and prisoner of [their] reproductive system[s]."s'
This biological reductivism persists, 2 and defining women in
terms of their bodies has served to circumscribe women's societal
and cultural value." Similarly, women's so-called "natural" unreli-
23. In 1870 a physician described this view of reproduction as the central and
defining force of women by saying it is "'as if the Almighty, in creating the female sex, had
taken the uterus and built up a woman around it.'" Carroll Smith-Rosenberg & Charles
Rosenberg, The Female Animal: Medical and Biological Views of Woman and Her Role in
Nineteenth-Century America, 60 J. AM. HIST. 332, 335 (1973).
It is interesting to note that what I term "myth" can also be termed "truth"; the
notion that reproduction is central to womanhood can be seen as a cultural distortion or
as a simple statement of fact. This duality, that depending on one's perspective a myth
can represent truth or fiction, explains myths' elusiveness and power.
24. See JANE M. USSHER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE FEMALE BODY 1-17 (1989).
25. See, e.g., ERIK ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS 285 (1968) (arguing that
anatomy is destiny "insofar as it determines not only the range and configuration of
physiological functioning and its limitation but also, to an extent, personality configura-
tions. The basic modalities of woman's commitment and involvement naturally also re-
flect the ground plan of her body"); ELAINE SHOWALTER, THE FEMALE MALADY: WOMEN,
MADNESS AND ENGLISH CULTURE, 1830-1980, at 55 (1985) (asserting that "theories of
female insanity were... linked to the biological crises of the female life-cycle-puberty,
pregnancy, childbirth, menopause").
26. SIART, supra note 20, at 95 (historically women were considered "unstable...
especially.., at times of child birth"). See also USSHER, supra note 24, at 1.
27. See, e.g., Elizabeth V. Spelman, Aristotle and the Politicization of the Soul, in
DISCOVERING REALITY: FEMINIST PERSPECTivES ON EPISTEMOLOGY, METAPHYSICS,
METHODOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 17 (Susan Harding & Merrill B. Hintka
eds., 1983) (discussing Aristotle's alignment of the female with the irrational).
28. See, e.g., USSHER, supra note 24, at 3-9.
29. Id. at4.'
30. See SHOWALTER, supra note 25, at 55 ("[The prevailing view among Victorian
psychiatrists was that.. . women were more vulnerable to insanity than men because the
instability of their reproductive systems interfered with their sexual, emotional, and ra-
tional control.").
31. Smith-Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 23, at 335. Adrienne Rich also con-
tends that the "institution" of motherhood, "aims at ensuring that.., all women.., shall
remain under ample control." RICH, supra note 22, at xv. She continues, "This institution
... has alienated women from our bodies by incarcerating us in them.., women are con-
trolled by lashing us to our bodies." Id.
32. USSHER, supra note 24, at xi, 9.
33. Ortner, supra note 20, at 87 asserts that the "consequence of the woman/nature
link "is a (sadly) efficient feedback system: various aspects of woman's situation (physical,
social, psychological) contribute to her being seen as closer to nature, while the view of
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ability or lack of self-control has formed a basis for invading and
regulating their reproductive lives. Where internal control has been
found lacking, external control has been imposed. 4 This has been
particularly true for African-American women, who have tradition-
ally been characterized as especially lacking sexual and reproduc-
tive self-control.3 5
her as closer to nature is in turn embodied in institutional forms that reproduce her
situation." Id. at 67, 87. Sara Ruddick notes this irony: "In most societies... women are
socially powerless in respect to the very reproductive capacities that *might make them
powerful. The primary bodily experience of mother is a poignant reminder that to think of
maternal power is immediately to recall maternal powerlessness-and conversely." Sara
Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, in WOMIEN, CULTURE AND MORALITY 207, 209 (Joseph L.
DeVitis ed., 1987). Similarly, Reva Siegel writes:
For too long this nation has regulated women's status through the institution of
motherhood. Its judgments about the ways in which it is reasonable to impose
on women as mothers are deeply distorted by a long history of denigrating, con-
trolling, and using women as mothers. For this reason, the physiological para-
digms that currently dominate review of reproductive regulation are deeply
pernicious.
Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation
and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 380 (1992).
34. Adrienne Rich has noted that "[elven safely caged in a single aspect of her be-
ing-the maternal-[woman] remains an object of mistrust, suspicion, misogyny in both
overt and insidious forms." RICH, supra note 22, at 116. Attempts to control women's
childbearing in the context of reproductive technology has been characterized as an at-
tempt to conquer woman's nature and contain her excesses. "It has been suggested that
men's alienation from reproduction.., has underpinned through the ages a relentless
male desire to master nature, and to construct social institutions and cultural patterns
that will not only subdue the waywardness of women but also give men an illusion of pro-
creative power." Michelle Stanworth, Birth Pangs: Contraceptive Technologies and the
Threat to Motherhood, in CONFLICTS IN FEMINISM 288 (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn Fox
Keller eds., 1990).
35. African-American women have particularly been mythologized in that their lack
of control of sexuality and reproduction has been seen as culturally defining. Dorothy E.
Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the
Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1438, 1444, (1991) (describing the myth of the
sexuality promiscuous black woman-the Jezebel--"a woman governed by her sexual de-
sires"); JOHN D'EMIIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTInATE MATTERS; A HISTORY OF
SExuALITY IN AiIERICA 101 (1988) ("According to popular *white opinions, black women
had strong passions and always desired sexual relations."). Patricia Williams put it this
way:
We live in a society in which the closest equivalent of nobility is the display of
unremittingly controlled will-fulness. To be perceived as unremittingly will-less
is to be imbued with an almost lethal trait.... I would characterize the treat-
ment of blacks by whites in whites' law as defining blacks as those who had no
will. I would characterize that treatment.., as a relation in which partializing
judgments, employing partializing standards of humanity, impose generalized
inadequacy on a race: if pure will or total control equals the perfect white person,
then impure will and total lack of control equals the perfect black man or woman.
Patricia J. Williams, On Being the Object of Property, 14 SIGNS 5, 7, 8 (1988).
Black women's perceived lack of self-control was translated into a judgment about
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As reproduction came to be seen as the locus for explaining
women, women's procreative capacity frequently came to serve as
the site for controlling women. 6 Because women's conduct and psy-
chology were thought, and not just figuratively, to have reproductive
roots, the remedy was also directed there.37 While the "scientific"
interrelation of woman and her body has been disproved-for in-
stance, hysteria is no longer considered a disease of the womb-the
conviction that, on some level, a woman is her maternal body, under-
lies the belief that controlling a woman's procreative powers is a
vehicle for controlling the whole woman. Women's bodies have thus
become "a point of entry for social norms."38
The story of Eve as told in the Old Testament is a familiar
myth in the Judeo-Christian tradition and represents a cultural
inscription of the mother/body myth. Genesis recounts: "Unto the
woman he said, I will greatly multiply thy sorrow in conception; in
sorrow thou shalt bring forth children; and thy desire shall by thy
husband, and he shall rule over thee." 9 Eve is made subject to the
claims of her maternal body-to pain in labor-as punishment for
her sin of discovering the pleasure of knowledge: childbearing and
punishment are thereby linked.4 ° Eve's punishment for her disobedi-
their ability to fill their social roles as mothers, as defined by the culturally prevalent
norms of white middle class motherhood. See Roberts, supra, at 1436-45 (discussing the
devaluation of black motherhood).
36. "[The female generative organs, the matrix of human life, have become a prime
target of patriarchal technology." RICH, supra note 22, at 116.
37. The belief in the interrelationship of woman's psychology and her reproductive
organs had been at times, quite literal, often with painful consequences for women. See
USSHER, supra note 24, at 6-7. Ussher explains that "[aill women's madness, illness and
deviant behavior was traditionally located in the womb .... Early medical interventions
for a wide range of illnesses experienced by women were centered on the womb, the ma-
trix of all problems." Id at 2. See also SHOWALTER, supra note 25, at 73.
38. SMART, supra note 20, at 113. Smart warns: "[Liaw has entry into minute aspects
of the life of the body and has the potential to regulate women's activities whilst
appearing most liberal and benevolent." Id. at 97. She illustrates with this example: the
"ideology of health and healthy babies-constructed as desirable personal goals, may be
transposed into oppressive forms of legislation which assume the terminology of
benevolence... ." Id. at 98. In fact the "ideology of healthy babies" is often proffered in de-
fense of the Norplant measures.
39. Genesis: 4:16 (King James). The curse placed on Eve was given a literal interpre-
tation will into the nineteenth century. RICH, supra note 22, at 117.
40. See Helen Callaway, 'The Most Essentially Female Function of All" Giving Birth,
in DEFINING FEMALES: THE NATURE OF WOMEN IN SOCIETY 163, 171 (1978) (asserting that
the story of Eve "setD the foundation for the negative attitudes towards women's
sexuality and child-bearing which have continued in Western civilisation [sic] for nearly
two thousand years."). See also Mieke Bal, Sexuality, Sin and Sorrow: The Emergence of
Female Character, in THE FEMALE BODY IN WESTERN CULTURE 317, 320 (Susan Suleiman
ed., 1986) ("The split between body and soul was retrospectively projected upon Eve as a
character, as she was interpreted after the working of the retrospective fallacy: so
attractive in body, so corrupt in soul, and hence, dialectically dangerous because of her
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ence, a "crime" without apparent relation to reproduction, is directed
at her reproductive capacity. Eve's legacy is evident in the stories of
the women discussed in this Comment, stories of women defined by
and regulated through their maternal bodies.
It is said that myths evolve over time, retaining certain core
attributes but possessing a flexibility that permits them to endure.41
Modern myths replicate age-old myths. Myths that equate women
with their maternal bodies are imbedded in history and culture. The
process by which these myths are perpetuated and the consequences
of their prevalence for women will be examined in the remainder of
this Comment.
II. TRACING THE IMAGES, MAPPING THE THOUGHT PROCESSES
My thought... is to look at a series of cases in the hope that we might learn
something experientially, both about the practices they reflect and about
our own expectations, as we find them confirmed or upset, concerning the
way judges ought to behave .... 42
This Part considers the involuntary sterilization of women,
discusses cases in which women have been ordered by courts not to
conceive and analyzes the Norplant measures. By identifying the
factors that transcend and unite these contexts and examining the
images and rhetoric that surround them, this Part seeks to elucidate
the impetus for judicial and legislative invocation of the mother/body
myth.
A. Involuntary Sterilization
Women-particularly those who are poor and of color 43 -have
attractiveness."); RICH, supra note 22, at 149 (noting a semantic link between punishment
and reproduction: the Roman's term for labor was "peona magna," which means both
"great pain" and "punishment, penalty").
41. See BLUMENBURG, supra note 4, at 34.
42. James Boyd White, Constructing a Constitution; "Original Intention" in the Slave
Cases, 47 MD. L.-REV. 239, 239, 240 (1987). The passage continues:
My aim is to examine the language of the opinion with a view to asking who the
judge makes himself, and his readers, in his writing- who he is as judge, and
how he addresses us as citizens and lawyers; how his way of talking to us, and
of inviting us in our turn to talk, defines the law in general.., and how the
conversation it seeks to start, or to continue, defines those relations among in-
dividuals and institutions that make up our public world.
Id. at 240.
43. Mertus and Heller, supra note 17, at 377; see also Laurie Nsiah-Jefferson,
Reproductive Laws, Women of Color, and Low-Income Women, in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS
FOR THE 1990S, at 46 (Sherrill Cohen & Nadine Taub eds., 1989) ("At times, poor women
and women of color have been subjected to blatant coercion; at other times, their 'choice'
of sterilization has been based on inadequate or no informed consent, the effects of pov-
erty, differential government funding schemes, and lack of birth control information.").
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been involuntarily sterilized throughout this century.44 Eugenic
sterilization laws directing the sterilization of socially "undesirable"
or mentally "unfit" individuals 45 were passed during the early nine-
teen hundreds46 and persist in some states today.47 Eugenic sterili-
zation laws were inspired by the belief that socially undesirable
traits were hereditary, and- therefore that preventing reproduction
would preclude those traits from being passed-on. 4 Traits thought
capable of intergenerational transmission included not only mental
illness or retardation, but also "character traits" such as "dishonesty,
criminality, and laziness."49 Individuals exhibiting these tendencies
were classified as "unfit" and sterilized pursuant to the eugenic
laws.50 Many women were sterilized under to such laws.51
In addition to being effectuated through eugenic sterilization
laws, the sterilization of so-called "incompetent" women has also
been accomplished via court orders.52 Judges have been called upon
44. State programs to involuntarily sterilize institutionalized individuals were active
between 1907-1963, particularly in the 1930s. PHILIP R. REILLY, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION:
A HISTORY OF INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 94 (1991). During this
period approximately 60,000 people were sterilized pursuant to these programs. Id.
45. See generally Elyce Z. Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit-Is Sterilization the
Answer?, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 591 (1966) (tracing the history of sterilization in the United
States and its use as an instrument of social policy).
46. The first eugenic sterilization law, authorizing sterilization of "confirmed crimi-
nals, idiots, imbeciles, and rapists," was passed in Indiana in 1907. REILLY, supra note 44,
at 45-46.
47. See generally RUTH HUBBARD, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S BIOLOGY 183 (1990)
(noting that twenty states currently still have compulsory sterilization laws on the books).
48. The term "eugenics" was coined by British intellectual Francis Galton in 1883
and denotes the theory that the human race can be improved if breeding is monitored to
eliminate undesirable traits. REILLY, supra note 44, at 3. The early American eugenics
movement tried to establish a scientific basis for the belief that African-Americans were
racially inferior. Id. at 5-7. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the focus
turned to identifying a biological explanation for "feeblemindedness." Id. at 8.
49. Elizabeth S. Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive
Rights and Family Privacy, 1986 DUKE L.J. 806, 809 n.12.
50. See Helen Rodriguez-Trias, Sterilization Abuse, in BIOLOGIcAL WOMAN: THE
CONVENIENT MYTH 147 (Ruth Hubbard et al. eds., 1982). The goal of prohibiting the
propagation of "unfit" individuals was also sought through laws preventing individuals so
classified from marrying, unless the prospective wife was too old to bear children. In
1965, Connecticut was the first state to prohibit any feebleminded people from marrying,
unless the woman was forty-five or more years old. REILLY, supra note 44, at 26. Another
law criminalized sexual relations between any "pauper" and a woman under age forty-
five. Id.
51. REILLY, supra note 44, at 94-95. Reilly recounts that in some states "only young
women were sterilized." Id. (emphasis in original).
52. Even when sterilization was provided for by a eugenics statute, the law might
require a court to approve a sterilization order. Kathryn A. Calibey, Comment,
Nonconsensual Sterilization of the Mentally Retarded-Analysis of Standards for Judicial
Determinations, 3 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 689, 693 (1981). In the 1960s, courts began to re-
ceive petitions requesting permission to sterilize noninstitutionalized, retarded women.
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to review eugenic sterilization laws, approve sterilization petitions
and to issue sterilization orders on their own authority. This Section
selects the compulsory sterilization case of In re Simpson 3 as a
paradigm of the mother/body myth.
Simpson considered whether to order the sterilization of Nora
Ann, an 18 year old with an IQ of 36.11 After citing Simpson's low
I.Q., the court continued:
Nora Ann Simpson is a physically attractive young woman, aged 18. She
has already given birth to one illegitimate child and according to the tes-
timony of her mother, and her own admission, she has been sexually pro-
miscuous with a number of young men since the birth of the child. Nora
Ann is unable to give her child proper care, and it is being cared for by her
mother. A portion of the medical testimony stated: '[blecause of the com-
bination of normal physical appearance and serious mental limitations,
this girl is likely to become pregnant repeatedly and produce children for
whom she cannot provide even the rudiments of maternal care.' There is
the further probability that such offspring will also be mentally deficient
and become a public charge for most of their lives. Application has been
made to the Muskingum County Welfare Department for Aid to
Dependent Children payments for the child already born.
5 6
The emphasis here is instructive. The court does not analyze
Simpson's mental condition. It fails even to discuss her I.Q., the sole
evidence offered that pertains to her "feeble-mindedness," 7 although
its authority to order the sterilization derives only from its statutory
mandate to supervise the care of "feeble-minded" individuals. 8
Rather than considering Simpson's mind, in other words, the court
focuses on Simpson's body.
In ordering Simpson's sterilization, the court appears to find
evidence of Simpson's sexuality, reproductive history, and economic
status most compelling. Consider the facts the court sets forth and
the conclusions it draws from them. After highlighting Simpson's
physical appearance and alluding to her sexual self, the court
stresses that Simpson is not married, that her child is illegitimate,
and that she and her child (and potential future children) pose a
burden to the state's welfare system.59 Made explicit is Simpson's
REILLY, supra note 44, at 149. For a court to order nonconsensual sterilization, specific
statutory authorization is usually, but not always required. Id. at 154-55; Calibey, supra,
at 693 n.27.
53. 180 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio P. Ct. Zanesville County 1962).
54. Id. at 207.
55.Id.
56. Id. at 207-08.
57. Id. at 207.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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"normal" and "attractive" appearance, and "sexual promiscuity.""
Implied is that Simpson will be unable or unwilling to resist the
overtures of men who will be attracted to her. The court infers that,
given these circumstances, Simpson will continually become preg-
nant and be an increasing burden to society.
How did the court determine which facts were relevant? Did
Simpson's perceived inability to "provide even the rudiments of ma-
ternal care"61 mean that she was unable to prevent herself from
becoming pregnant, and moreover, that she should irrevocably lose
the ability to make reproductive choices? What, for instance, made
one "illegitimate" birth evidence of Simpson's incompetence? At least
a partial answer to this last question inheres in the way the court
looked at the case. In order for the illegitimate birth to constitute
evidence of incompetence, the court cast the question of Simpson's
competence in terms of her ability to control her (maternal) body.
The court's opinion cites Simpson's "feeble" mind to explain her
"out-of-control" body, but maneuvers until it can conclude that
Simpson's "out-of-control" body indicates the presence of a "feeble"
mind.62
Buck v. Bell,63 in which the United Sates Supreme Court up-
held Virginia's compulsory sterilization law,6 is also useful for
thinking about which facts courts contemplating sterilization will
find determinative. As with Simpson, the ostensible justification for
Carrie Buck's institutionalization and subsequent sterilization was
her alleged mental deficiency. 65 Yet recent scholarship has revealed
60. Id. See Deborah H. Ross, Sterilization of the Developmentally Disabled: Shedding
Some Myth-conceptions, 9 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 599, 617-18 (1981) (discussing the myths
about the lack of sexual self-control of the "feebleminded").
61. Simpson, 180 N.E.2d at 208.
62. The case of Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978), reinforces some of the
themes extant in In re Simpson. The court in Downs noted that Georgia Mae Downs was
"a deaf mute mother of two children born out of wedlock." Id. One of the physicians testi-
fying at trial stated that Downs "apparently lackled] ability to curtail normal appetite for
sex,' that she was '[plotentially dangerous', and that her low economic earning power
demonstrated 'irresponsibility.' The second physician's rep6rt stated, 'uncontrolled appe-
tite leads to promiscuity. Apparently retarded. Incapable of functioning in maternal role.'"
Id. at 5.
63. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
64. Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, found the law to be a legitimate means
for curing social ills and lifting the burden placed by certain persons on society as a
whole:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best
citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who al-
ready sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices ... in order to pre-
vent our being swamped with incompetence.
Id. at 207.
65. Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell,
1993] 715
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
that Buck was a "normal" child who did well in school 66 and had
been institutionalized because she, like her mother before her, gave
birth to an illegitimate child.67 This suggests that beneath the osten-
sible legal focus on Buck's mental capacity was a tacit awareness
that controlling Buck's ability to reproduce had as much to do with
her maternal status as her mental status.
Both Simpson and Buck suggest that factors about a woman's
maternal status-evidence of a woman's ability to control her body-
have been given weight in sterilization proceedings. Simpson and
Buck also illustrate the coexistence of fact and fiction in myth. It
may be "true" that many so-called incompetent women have children
out-of-wedlock and that adding children to the welfare rolls depletes
states' financial resources. However, the "untruth" of the myth is the
"if-then" relationship between incompetence and marital or mater-
nal status: the notion that the presence of one of these facts signals
the presence of the others. This raises the question of how often
blurring lines between types of "undesirable" behavior can provide
implicit justification for judicial outcomes. Such "associational"
thinking sustains the mother/body myth: through this reasoning
process the court is able to make the link between a woman's mental
incompetence and her ability to control her maternal body.
Now consider how the Simpson court frames its decision. The
court first holds Simpson responsible for the circumstances which
warrant her sterilization, and then suggests that its decision was in
Simpson's best interests. The court paradoxically holds Simpson
accountable for the lack of responsibility evidenced by her "sexual
promiscuity," the combination of her attractive appearance and
perceived inability to resist sexual advances. It is her responsibility
for her irresponsibility that justifies her sterilization. Finally, and
perhaps most ironically, the court ultimately punishes Simpson for
her irresponsibility by promising to free her offfuture responsibility.
Courts often use the gloss of a woman's "best interests" to
shroud their intervention in women's lives. The Simpson court
concludes by stating: 'To deny Nora Ann such an operation would be
to condemn her to a lifetime of frustration and drudgery, as she
continued to bring children into the world for whom she is not capa-
ble, either physically or mentally, of providing proper care."6 The
60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 52 (1985).
66. I at 52.
67. Id. at 53. Carrie Buck's pregnancy was the result of rape. Id. at 54. Philip Reilly
reports that "young women who were at most mildly retarded were often admitted [to in-
stitutions] for the sole purpose of being sterilized." REILLY, supra note 44, at 98-99.
68. 180 N.E.2d at 208 (emphasis added). Again evident is the court's sense that
Simpson is bound to be "perpetually pregnant" if she is not sterilized. See STELLMAN, su-
pra note 22, at 179.
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courts final words are that sterilization is "necessary for the health
and welfare of said Nora Ann Simpson,"69 yet the fact that it has
spent much of the opinion addressing the shortage of welfare funds
and social services indicates where its true concern lies.
Similarly, courts at times stress that the woman affected has
chosen the intervention or agreed that it was in her best interests.
In re Cavitt,70 for instance, upheld the constitutionality of a statute
requiring institutionalized mentally retarded persons to be steril-
ized prior to their discharge.7'1 The court reasoned that Gloria Cavitt
could avoid sterilization by choosing to remain institutionalized.2
The notion that women in such situations are free to choose their
procreative fate becomes a powerful rhetorical tool for courts and
legislators: the reality of constraint is carefully hidden in the lan-
guage of liberty. 3
This Section now turns to legislation proposed in the middle of
this century, which would have required single mothers on welfare
to be sterilized as a precondition to receiving further benefits.74
These initiatives are informed by the same assumptions and myths
about women that were evident in the involuntary sterilization
cases.
One proposed bill provided that any woman who gave birth to
more than two illegitimate children would be convicted of a crime
punishable by a fine, up to three years imprisonment, or both.75 The
woman would then be "declared morally unfit for the care, custody
and control of any of her existing children," her children would be
placed in permanent state custody and she would be sterilized.6 The
State Senator who introduced the bill explained: "When you have a
69. 180 N.E.2d at 208.
70. 157 N.W.2d 171 (Neb. 1968).
71. Id. at 174.
72. Id. at 178. The Nebraska legislature repealed the law at its next session. REILLY,
supra note 44, at 149.
73. The dissenting judge objected to the majority's characterization of Cavitt's choice,
noting that the statute's "coercive feature is hardly masked by the fictive option of sterili-
zation or life imprisonment." Cavitt, 157 N.W.2d at 179.
74. According to one source, California, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana,
Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina and Virginia all "evidenced various degrees of in-
terest in punitive sterilization." Julius Paul, The Return of Punitive Sterilization
Proposals, 3 LAW & SOcY REV. 77, 79 (1968). These proposals were "aimed particularly at
the mothers ... of illegitimate children, especially those receiving help from the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC)." Id. at 78. See also Mertus & Heller,
supra note 17, at 380 (citing NATIONAL WOMEN's HEALTH NETWORK, STERILIZATION
ABUSE: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT CAN BE CONTROLLED 5-6 (1981)); REILLY, supra note 44, at
160-61.
75. Paul, supra note 74, at 84. This bill was introduced in the Maryland Senate in
1960.
76. Id. at 84-85. This measure passed the Maryland Senate by a vote of 23 to 3.
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woman who has seven or eight illegitimate children and she keeps
on having them at the expense of the taxpayers it's time to do some-
thing about it.""
A bill introduced into the Mississippi House of Representatives
in 1958 was entitled "An Act to Discourage Immorality of Unmar-
ried Females by Providing for Sterilization of the Unwed Mother
Under Conditions of this Act; And for Related Purposes." 8 The
Representative who authored that bill explained that, "[tihe negro
woman, because of child welfare assistance, [is] making it a busi-
ness, in some cases of giving birth to illegitimate children .... The
purpose of my bill was to try to stop, or slow down, such traffic at its
source."
79
These bills linking reproduction and welfare epitomize the
mother/body myth. The title of the Mississippi bill draws on
mother/body myth rhetoric, employing words such as "immorality"
and "unmarried." The bills portray women as "unfit" and
"perpetually pregnant" and also as culpable-their crime is burden-
ing taxpayers. These bills were more overtly punitive than the
eugenic sterilization cases, and lacked the rhetoric of being in the
woman's best interests; perhaps their lack of subtlety explains why
they were ultimately unsuccessful.
While the bills tying reproduction to welfare were not adopted,
other measures, cast differently, have been accepted. Incentive
schemes which induce women to undergo involuntary sterilizations
or curtail their reproduction have become accepted policy practice.
Incentive schemes designed to promote sterilization or contraception
have, for example, been employed in the population control context.8 0
Agencies seeking to stem population growth in some countries have
supported the use of incentives or compensation payments. 8'
77. Id. at 85-86 n.12 (quoting WASH. STAR, Feb. 12, 1960). Compare this with Kerry
Patrick's justification of his bill offering financial incentives to women on welfare if they
would consent to implantation with Norplant, introduced 31 years later. See infra text ac-
companying note 312.
78. Paul, supra note 74, at 88.
79. Id. at 89.
80. See BETSY HARTMALNN, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND WRONGS 65-73 (1987)
(discussing the debate over the propriety of offering incentives to encourage behavior
modification). Incentives in the form of payments are most often made to family planning
practitioners to encourage sterilization of or the provision of contraceptives to their pa-
tients, but incentives are sometimes -made directly to individuals. Id. at 66 (A table on
that page cites statistics from 1983 documenting that ten countries offer incentives to in-
dividuals to be sterilized and that nine countries offer incentives for contraceptive use by
individuals.). Other forms of incentives include community incentives and government
sponsored incentives. Id. at 68-69.
81. Id. at 213-20. As with all the measures discussed herein, incentive schemes also
most often disadvantage poor people. See, e.g., id. at 65-66, 71-72, 213-15.
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Similarly, welfare reformers in the United States have proposed
incentive schemes to modify welfare recipients' childbearing activ-
ity.82 Underlying such measures is the message: If you are not being
a productive member of society at least control yourself and stop
having so many children.3
Finally, involuntary sterilizations have been effectuated
through informal means. Women have been involuntarily sterilized
in private doctors' offices and in public clinics, where sterilizations
have sometimes been encouraged by federal family planning pro-
grams.14 The possibility of coercion and abuse of authority even in
such ostensibly voluntary contexts is great. Women undergoing sur-
gical procedures have been sterilized without their knowledge or
consent."5 Welfare workers or doctors have threatened women with
withholding public assistance until they have agreed to steriliza-
tion.86 Not surprisingly, as with the other measures, women who are
poor, single and of color have most often been affected, again reveal-
ing that across contexts similar factors and assumptions engender
and enable the reproductive control of women. 7
82. See Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare
Reform Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719 (1992) (outlining the historical context for welfare
measures designed to modify recipients' behavior in order to reduce the welfare rolls, and
describing two such measures). The fact that these incentive policies may be more subtly
worded than the language in the sterilization cases or in the proposed legislative
measures targeting AFDC recipients for sterilization may account for their comparative
legislative success.
83. See id. at 746.
84. The court in Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974), striking down
certain portions of federally funded sterilization laws, noted that poor women were often
coerced into undergoing sterilization procedures:
Although Congress has been insistent that all family planning programs func-
tion on a purely voluntary basis there is uncontroverted evidence in the record
that minors and other incompetents have been sterilized with federal funds and
that an indefinite number of poor people have been improperly coerced into ac-
cepting a sterilization operation under the threat that various federally sup-
ported welfare benefits would be withdrawn unless they submitted to irrevers-
ible sterilization. Patients receiving medicaid assistance at childbirth are evi-
dently the most frequent targets of this pressure.. . Mrs. Waters was actually
refused medical assistance by her attending physician unless she submitted to a
tubal ligation after the birth.
Id. at 1199.
85. See Edward J. Spriggs, Jr., Note, Involuntary Sterilization: An Unconstitutional
Menace to Minorities and the Poor, 4 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 127, 132 n.45 (1974).
86. Id. at 131-32.
87. See, e.g., Nsiah-Jefferson, supra note 43, at 23, 46-48 (offering evidence and
examples of different forms of sterilization abuse of women of color and poor women);
Williams, supra note 35, at 7-8 n.5; Mertus & Heller, supra note 17, at 377 (citing John P.
Radford, Sterilization Versus Segregation: Control of the 'Feebleminded," 1900-1938, 33
SOC. SC. MED. 449 (1991)); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under
Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1301 n.94 (1991). See also HARiTMANN, supra note 80, at 240
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This Section briefly reviewed judicial, legislative and private
attempts and successes in involuntarily sterilizing women. Despite
the temporal and qualitative distinctions between these contexts,
several factors unite them. The vast majority of the individuals
affected are women, and most are members of a marginalized class.
In addition, the substantive conclusions of law and legislative ra-
tionales often rest on imagery of and assumptions about marital
status and maternal responsibility. Finally, a woman's reproductive
body is the means through which other social goals are realized;
barring procreation purportedly serves not only the woman herself
but also society, by eliminating the "feebleminded" and "immoral"
and easing welfare burdens. In reflecting on the cases presented in
Sections Il.B and lI.C, consider whether the real social goal is not
rather reproductive control itself. Consider how often courts faced
with an issue not initially defined as one of maternal status, use
maternal status to redefine the issue and propel the maternal body
to center stage.
B. Court-Ordered Contraception
Through probation conditions and plea agreements, courts have
ordered individuals not to conceive, to use birth control or to un-
dergo sterilization as punishment for crimes. 81 These judgments
(noting that the limited birth control options of "poor white, black, Hispanic, and Native
American women... was further restricted in 1977 when public funding of abortion was
virtually eliminated, although sterilization continues to be covered in Medicaid programs
for up to 90 percent of the cost.").
88. My research disclosed sixteen such cases, in addition to the eight cases which
have involved Norplant (see infra notes 186-89 for cases involving Norplant). In ten of the
cases in which trial courts prohibited probationers from getting pregnant, appellate
courts invalidated the probation condition. People v. Zaring, 8 Cal. App. 4th 362 (Ct. App.
1992) (woman convicted of drug possession ordered not to get pregnant as condition of
probation); People v. Pointer, 151 Cal. App. 3d 1128 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1984) (woman in
child neglect case ordered not to conceive during five year probation term); People v.
Domingnez, 256 Cal. App. 2d 623 (Ct. App. 1967) (woman robber ordered not to get
pregnant until married as probation condition); In re Hernandez, see Ferster, supra note
45, at 611 (woman "knowingly present in room where narcotics were smoked" offered
sterilization as a condition of probation); Thomas v. State, 519 So.2d 1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1988) (woman convicted of stealing ordered not to get pregnant as condition of pro-
bation); Wiggins v. State, 386 So.2d 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (woman convicted of rob-
bery/forgery ordered not to have sex until married as condition of probation); State v.
Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (woman charged with abandoning her child
ordered not to get pregnant as a probation condition); State v. Norman, 484 So.2d 952
(La. Ct. App. 1986) (woman convicted of forgery ordered not to give birth to any
illegitimate children as a condition of probation); Rodrignez v. State, 378 So.2d 7 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (woman charged with child abuse prohibited from marrying or
becoming pregnant for ten year probation period); State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335
(Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (woman charged with child abuse ordered not to have children as a
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predominantly affect women, sometimes men,89 and in at least one
instance has involved a couple." The women subjected to these
condition of probation).
Several additional cases came to my attention through secondary sources; as far as I
am aware, none of these orders were appealed. These include the cases of: Tracy Wilder,
see Felicity Barringer, Sentence for Killing Newborn: Jail Term, Then Birth Control, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 1990, at 1 (Florida woman charged in death of child sentenced to ten
years probation with birth control); Melody Baldwin, see 10-Year Term Imposed Despite
Sterilization, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 11, 1988, at 3 (Indiana woman pled guilty to felony child
neglect and agreed to undergo sterilization as part of plea agreement); Debra Forster, see
Woman's Sentence is Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1988, at A22 (Arizona woman
charged with child neglect ordered to use birth control for life); Melinda Middleton, see
Convicted Child Abuser Undergoes Court-Suggested Sterilization, UPI, Nov. 19, 1981,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (California woman convicted of child abuse
agreed to sterilization as an alternative to prison sentence); Helen James, see Anna
Lowenhaupt Tsing, Monster Stories: Women Charged with Perinatal Endangerment in
UNCERTAIN TERMS: NEGOTIATING GENDER IN AMERICAN CULTURE 282, 295 (Faye
Ginsburg & Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing eds., 1990) (woman charged with attempted murder
ordered to undergo mandatory pregnancy testing every six months for ten years); Debra
Ann Williams, see Jef Feeley, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 18, 1986, at 61 (South Carolina woman
charged with murder was allowed to plead to manslaughter when she agreed to be
sterilized).
For discussions of court-ordered birth control, see Jack P. Lipton & Colin F.
Campbell, The Constitutionality of Court-Imposed Birth Control as a Condition of
Probation, 6 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 271 (1989); Elinor F. Parker, Note, Birth Control
as a Probation Condition for Child Abusers-Creative Alternative or Unconstitutional
Condition? 19 W. ST. U. L. REV. 289 (1991). See also Colleen M. Coyle, Note, Sterilization:
A 'Remedy for the Malady' of Child Abuse?, 5 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY 245 (1989)
(describing the case of Debra Ann Williams and arguing that court orders of sterilization
for child abusers is inappropriately punitive); Stephanie B. Goldberg, No Baby, No Jail,
A.B.A. J., Oct. 1992, at 90 (discussing People v. Zaring, 8 Cal. App.4th 362 (Ct. App.
1992), which struck down a probation condition prohibiting pregnancy); Marriage or Else!,
NAT'L L.J., May 9, 1983, at 39 (Minnesota judge imposes probation conditions requiring
defendants to stop cohabitating with members of the opposite sex, to marry, or else to go
to jail).
89. Michael Howland, convicted of negligent child abuse, was ordered not to father
any children during his five year term of probation. Howland v. State, 420 So.2d 918 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982). The court struck down this condition as not "reasonably related" to
the crime of child abuse. Id. The court further reasoned that the condition was
unnecessary bedause Howland had already been ordered by other conditions of probation
not to have contact with any children under the age of sixteen. Id. at 920. Darrell Mays
pled guilty to burglary and as one of the conditions of his probation was ordered not to
live with members of the opposite sex unless married. The court directed that this order
be modified; it was overbroad as it stood because it would prevent him from living with
any female relative. Mays v. State, 349 So.2d at 794 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). Edward
Michalow was directed, as a condition of probation, to "rectify' his marital situation and
to make his child 'legitimate' within one year." Michalow v. State, 362 So.2d 456, 457
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). That condition-one essentially requiring that he marry the
mother of his child-was found to exceed the trial court's discretion. Id.
90. Smith v. Superior Court, 725 P.2d 1101 (Ariz. 1986) (striking trial court's order
offering a lesser sentence to a couple convicted of child abuse on the condition that they
be sterilized).
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orders committed crimes ranging from child abuse,91'to drug use,92 to
stealing.93 Probation orders prohibiting procreation again betrayjudicial preoccupation with the maternal body, signaling the need to
map the processes which underlie them.
The following are glimpses of cases in which courts have or-
dered contraceptive use by women who have abused their children."
Seventeen year-old Tracy Wilder pled guilty to manslaughter for the
suffocation of her newborn daughter.95 Wilder, who claimed that she
was unaware that she was pregnant, was driven to the hospital after
she began bleeding and experiencing abdominal pain.96 She gave
birth in a hospital bathroom, wrapped the infant in plastic and
placed her in a garbage can.97 Wilder was sentenced to two years in
jail and ten years probation with birth control." Had she not agreed
to the probation condition, she could have received a sentence of
twelve to twenty-two years in prison.9 Debra Forster, also seven-
teen, was sentenced to lifetime use of birth control when she pled
guilty to child neglect'01 for leaving her infant sons alone for two
days in a hot apartment.' 0'
In at least three instances, women have been offered the option
of undergoing sterilization in return for a reduced charge or sen-
tence. Melody Baldwin, a thirty year-old Indiana woman, consented
to sterilization as part of a plea agreement in 1988."02 Baldwin pled
guilty to felony child neglect in connection with the death of her four
year-old son who died of an overdose of psychiatric drugs.0 3 Twenty-
91. See, e.g., People v. Pointer, 151 Cal. App.3d 1128 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1989).
92. See, e.g., People v. Zaring, 8 Cal. App.4th 362 (Ct. App. 1992).
93. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 519 So.2d 1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
94. I reiterate that much of my information is gleaned from media coverage of these
cases. Hence it should be kept in mind that I am presenting the "facts" reporters selected
in weaving their stories.
95. Barringer, supra note 88, at 1. The case was presided over by Judge Lawrence
Page Haddock of Duval County Circuit Court, Florida. Id.
96. Id. at 33. Sometimes women are convicted of crimes of child neglect when,
unaware or denying that they are pregnant, they deliver without preparation and with no
prenatal care. This ignorance of one's pregnancy-failure'to be fully consumed by one's
maternal body-has frequently contributed to the construction of the "bad mother." See
generally Tsing, supra note 88.
97. Barringer, supra note 88, at 33. Helen James, by contrast, gave birth in a hospi-
tal toilet and the infant was revived by nurses. James was charged anyway. See Tsing,
supra note 88, at 282.
98. Barringer, supra note 88, at 1. The type of birth control was not specified. See id.
99. Id. at 33.
100. Id. Forster became pregnant several months later thus Judge Lindsay Ellis
Budzyn deleted the birth control requirements as unenforceable. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
MOTHER IBODY MYTH
six year old Debra Ann Williams was charged with murder for allow-
ing her three month old son to starve to death. 04 Williams consented
to sterilization in return for being allowed to plead guilty to the
lesser crime of manslaughter.0 5 Melinda Middleton pled guilty to
child abuse for her role in causing the death of her infant, who suf-
fered from whiplash injuries and malnutrition. 06 At the court's
behest, Middleton agreed to be sterilized as a condition of probation
rather than serve a three year prison term.
107
Judge Jensen, the presiding judge in Middleton's case, stated
that he wanted the District Attorney's office to investigate the possi-
bility of sterilization as a probation condition: "It's an extremely
shocking case, a revolting one, and I want to look into extreme pos-
sibilities."08 Before sentencing, the judge learned that Middleton
was pregnant again, and considered requiring her to have an abor-
tion as a probation condition. 0 9 The judge stated that, although he
opposed abortion, "these people just shouldn't have children.""0
Although Judge Jensen's phrase, "these people," could logically refer
to Middleton and her husband, the judge only meted out reproduc-
tive punishment to the mother."' More broadly, "these people"
might have denoted the larger group of women "like" Middleton:
women who are poor, unwed, and perceived as irresponsible-
women, in other words, the State should prevent from having chil-
dren.
In contrast to the eugenic sterilization cases, in which the evil
sought to be addressed was, at least nominally, reproduction, the
crimes courts punish by mandating contraceptive use less obviously
implicate reproduction. There is a greater divide between reproduc-
tion and the harm sought to be prevented and remedied. From this
perspective, punishing child abusers by prohibiting pregnancy is
entirely misdirected: it punishes women for their procreative con-
104. Feeley, supra note 88, at 61.
105. Id.
106. Convicted Child Abuser Undergoes Court-Suggested Sterilization, supra note 88.
107. Id. Her attorney apparently informed Middleton that "sterilization is
questionable under state law," but, he said, "she just doesn't want anymore [sic]
children." Id.
108. Judge Asks if Sterilization Can be Condition of Probation, UPI, June 27, 1981,
available in, LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
109. Id.
110. Id. (emphasis added). Middleton ultimately gave birth to this child, and a
petition was filed to make the child a ward of the court. Convicted Child Abuser
Undergoes Court-Suggested Sterilization, supra note 88.
111. Middleton's husband was convicted on a misdemeanor count in relation to the
case and was sentenced to probation; apparently no probation conditions related to pro-
creation were imposed upon him. Convicted Child Abuser Undergoes Court-Suggested
Sterilization, supra note 88.
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duct, not their criminal conduct." 2 However, from another perspec-
tive-the perspective, perhaps, of the judges who issue these proba-
tion conditions-punishing the maternal body does strike at the root
of the problem.13
The court-ordered contraception cases do resemble the eugenic
and compulsory sterilization cases, however, in that each of these
cases suggest some other factor, a more obvious focus, that could
have, and arguably should have, been central to the courts' deci-
sions. For instance, courts reviewing an eugenic or compulsory ster-
ilization order could engage in a narrower inquiry than the Simpson
court did, by limiting themselves to an inquiry into "feebleminded-
ness" or "incompetence." Of course, the Simpson court might re-
spond by saying that its review of the facts was designed to assess
Simpson's feeblemindedness. Similarly, judges designing probation
conditions for child abusers could consider only their criminal con-
duct. These judges might also respond that all evidence of bad
mothering is relevant to determining an appropriate sanction, and
again, the disagreement would be over whether the facts relied upon
truly indicate bad mothering. When courts shift their focus from the
"presenting problem" to the maternal body, it suggests that they
have implicitly redefined the presenting problem as one that directly
implicates reproduction. This shift in focus broadens the range of
facts courts can deem relevant.
It becomes pertinent at this point to briefly address the legal
standard state appellate courts have used when reviewing and strik-
ing down probation conditions prohibiting reproduction.14 These
courts have applied the Dominguez/Lent test for determining
whether a condition of probation is valid."5 Under this "reasonable-
ness" test,
[a] condition of probation which (1) has no relationship to the crime of
which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in it-
self criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably
112. Such reproductive sanctions convey the message that childbearing by certain
women in certain contexts is criminal conduct. Indeed, were a woman to violate a
probation order by getting pregnant, conception would become, in essence, a crininal act.
113. It is interesting that in the cases in which men have'been ordered not to procre-
ate, even where the man was a child abuser, the reviewing courts seemed to have a much
easier time finding that there was no relationship between the probation condition and
the crime. See cases cited supra note 89.
114. See cases cited supra note 88. For a discussion of the legal validity of probation
conditions prohibiting pregnancy, see Parker, supra note 88, Lipton & Campbell, supra
note 88 and Arthur, supra note 17.
115. People v. Dominguez, 256 Cal. App. 2d 623, 627 (Ct. App. 1967). The tests ap-
plied by other state courts reviewing probation conditions prohibiting pregnancy
conditions are identical or substantially the same. See, e.g., State v. Livingston, 372
N.E.2d 1335, 1337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976).
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related to future criminality does not serve the statutory ends of probation
and is invalid."
6
Thus, on its face, this is a test for determining relevancy. The
Dominguez/Lent standard was applied by the California Court of
Appeals in People v. Pointer,"7 in which a woman who had been
found guilty of felony child endangerment successfully challenged an
order barring her from conceiving for the duration of her five year
probationary term."8 The appellate court reversed the part of the
trial court's order directing Pointer not to conceive while on proba-
tion. The Pointer court found, however, that it could "not say that
the condition of probation prohibiting conception [was] completely
unrelated to the crime" of felony child endangerment." 9 The court
held that the pregnancy prohibition impermissibly impinged on
Pointer's exercise of her fundamental constitutional right to procre-
ate.120
The DominguezILent standard is meant to prevent "unrelated"
considerations from influencing probation conditions.'' As discussed
above, what is perceived and presented as "related" will in large part
be determined by the judge's view of the case and will be reflected in
the judicial casting of the opinion. The next group of cases to be
116. Dominguez, 256 Cal. App. 2d at 627.
117. 151 Cal. App.3d 1128 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1984).
118. Id. at 1133. Pointer adhered to a strict macrobiotic diet and only fed macrobiotic
foods to her children. Id. at 1131. Her infant suffered from severe malnourishment. Id. at
1132. Pointer would not modify her 'son's diet, and he eventually became semi-comatose
and required hospitalization. Id.
119. Id. at 1138-39.
120. Id. at 1139-40. The court also found that more narrowly tailored means to
achieve the same ends were available, suggesting periodic pregnancy testing and the pos-
sibility of removing Pointer's children from custody at birth as narrower alternatives. Id.
at 1140.
121. In several instances, appellate courts admonished the trial judge for inteijecting
extra-legal considerations into the sentencing decision. See, e.g., People v. Dominguez,
256 Cal. App. 2d 623, 628 (Ct. App. 1967) and People v. Zaring, 8 Cal. App. 4th 362, 374
(Ct. App. 1992)..
Some of the cases that have reversed probation conditions forbidding procreation
have done so because of the lack of statutory authority permitting them. See, e.g., Zaring,
8 Cal. App. 4th at 374 ("In our view, the morality of having children while on public assis-
tance, and the imposing of any constitutionally permissible legal deterrences to such a
practice, are matters properly left to the.., legislature."); Smith v. Superior Court, 725
P.2d 1101 (Ariz. 1986) (noting that the majority view is that sterilization should not be
permitted absent specific statutory authorization and that only one criminal case-People
v. Blankenship, 61 P.2d 352 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936)-has upheld sterilization absent
such authority.) This raises the question of whether judges are trying (or succeeding,
without consciously trying) to achieve via the judiciary what has not been able to be real-
ized through the legislatures. See Coyle, supra note 88, at 260, 261 (noting that
"prosecutors, through plea negotiations, have avoided the constitutional challenge by en-
couraging the willing child abuse defendant to bargain his/her reproductive rights.").
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considered make this clear.
Several courts have ordered contraception for women whose
crimes are seemingly unrelated to mothering, such as forgery 122 or
robbery.1 3 Such cases further illuminate both the underlying dy-
namic of court-ordered contraception cases and the ways in which
these cases fit into the involuntary sterilization cases discussed in
the last Section, and the Norplant measures to be discussed in the
next Section.
In re Hernandez'" represents perhaps the most shocking in-
stance of a punishment not fitting the crime. The court ordered a
woman's sterilization as punishment for a minor crime unrelated to
child care. In 1966, twenty-one year-old Nancy Hernandez was of-
fered the choice between sterilization and probation or the maxi-
mum penalty for her offense, six months in jail. 2 ' Hernandez's crime
was knowingly being present in a room where narcotics were used. 126
The court stated: "[Tihis woman is in danger of continuing to lead a
dissolute life and to be endangering the health, safety and lives of
her minor children."'27 Hernandez had a child out-of-wedlock, 2 8 and
both she and the child received public assistance. 129 Although the
sterilization provision was stricken by a higher court, even that
court devoted "almost half [its] opinion... to the problem of public
support of illegitimate children and their mothers.'3
Hernandez's crime of being in the wrong place at the wrong
time led to generalizations about her moral character, which in turn
became the basis for declaring her an unfit parent. And even though
there were neither allegations nor evidence of Hernandez's mis-
treatment of her children, the judge felt that presenting Hernandez
with the choice of sterilization or jail (without addressing whether
there was any non-conjectural evidence that she posed a threat to
her children) was appropriate.
People v. Zaring3 ' illustrates the same judicial movement.
Linda Gail Zaring pled guilty to drug possession.' While no evi-dence suggested that Zaring's children ever had any drug-related
122. State v. Norman, 484 So.2d 952 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
123. Thomas v. State, 591 So.2d 1113 (Fla. App. 1st Dist. 1988).
124. See Ferster, supra note 45, at 611 (citing In Re Hernandez, No. 76757 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Santa Barbara County June 8, 1966)).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 611-12 (citing WAsH. POST, May 25, 1966, at A9).
128. Id. at 612.
129. Id. at 611.
130. Id. at 612.
131. People v. Zaring, 8 Cal. App. 4th 362 (Ct. App. 1992).
132. Id. at 364.
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ailments,83 Judge Broadman, who also sentenced Darlene Johnson
to Norplant,' M reprimanded Zaring as follows:
'You are... ordered not to get pregnant during the term as condition of
your probation which is a term of five years.... I want make [sic] to make
it clear that one of the reasons I am making this order is you've got five
children. You're thirty years old. None of your children are in your custody
or control. Two of them on AFDC. And I'm afraid that if you get pregnant
we're going to get a cocaine or heroin addicted baby."
135
How did the court turn from punishing drug possession to ordering
contraceptive use?13 Operative here is the "burden on the welfare
roll" rationale which emerged in the involuntary sterilization cases.
Judge Broadman's decision to inhibit Zaring's ability to procreate
conveys the message that Zaring's arguable lack of fiscal responsibil-
ity could be remedied by reproductive control. Zaring also introduces
a new strand of judicial thought; maternal irresponsibility is per-
ceived to begin prenatally. Zaring's focus on the maternal body as the
site for curing the woman, regardless of her ailment, is the essence of
the mother/body myth.
Judge Broadman's statement in Zaring is almost identical to
remarks made by a judge over two decades ago. In People v.
Dominguez,37 the defendant was found guilty of robbing a liquor
store. 8" She was twenty years old, had never been married, had two
young children and was pregnant.3 9 She had received public assis-
tance since the birth of her first child. 4 ° Dominguez was sentenced
to probation with the following condition:
13. Id. at 371.
134. For a discussion of the Johnson case, see section II.C.2.b, infra.
135. Zaring, 8 Cal. App. 4th at 368 (quoting Broadman, J.).
136. The appellate court reviewing and reversing Judge Broadman's order stated:
In the instant case, the crime of possession of heroin in and of itself does not
appear to have any relationship to children born or unborn. The crime was not
against a child, it did not endanger a child, and precluding pregnancy has no
readily perceivable effect on rehabilitation as that concept is interpreted in the
law. It is now widely believed that a pregnant woman-can expose a fetus to dan-
ger by ingesting certain drugs during pregnancy, and we think that such an en-
dangerment would be deplorable, but we are constrained by our oath to refrain
from imposing our personal views on people brought before the bench.
Id. at 372. It should be noted that the court repeatedly stressed that it did not decide
whether the trial coures no pregnancy order had a sufficient relationship to the crime to
satisfy the test for a valid condition of probation. Id. at 371, 373, 375.
137. 256 Cal. App. 2d 623 (Ct. App. 1967). Recall that this was the case that estab-
lished, along with People v. Lent, the standard for assessing the validity of probation
conditions that governs many of these cases. See supra text accompanying note 116.
138. Dominguez, 256 Cal. App. at 625.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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'[Y]ou are not to live with any man until after you become married and
you are not to become pregnant until after you become married. Now this
will develop just by becoming pregnant. You are going to prison unless you
are married first. You already have too many of those. Do you understand
that [sic] I am saying? 14 1
The court continued to berate Dominguez: "If you insist on this kind
of conduct you can at least consider the other people in society who
are taking care of your children. You have had too many that [sic]
some others are taking care of other than you and the father.
Although there was no evidence that Dominguez treated her chil-
dren inadequately, the court found her "irresponsible '"" ' for burden-
ing society with her children on public assistance, and stated that
this behavior justified the probation condition. 44In addition to Dominguez and Hernandez, Christine Thomas14
was convicted of "grand theft and battery"4 6 and sentenced to proba-
tion with the condition that she not get pregnant unless she was
married. 147 Savitri Norman 45 was convicted of forgery and ordered
not to conceive as long as she remained unmarried. The trial court
in Norman, like the Dominquez court, "characterized giving birth to
illegitimate children as evidence of 'irresponsible thinking.'"" '4
This equation of single motherhood with maternal "irrespon-
sibility" immediately recalls In re Simpson.' The Simpson court
deduces Simpson's incompetence from her "sexual promiscuity" and
illegitimate child-evidence of her lack of self-control. Norman also
ultimately draws a conclusion about Norman's mental state (her
irresponsibility) from facts it construes as illuminating her inability
to regulate her own body. The Norman court apparently feels that
without the aid of externally imposed control, Norman might further
offend society by bearing children out-of-wedlock.
These cases seem to offer new and shifting definitions of in-
competence. When courts perceive that a woman cannot adequately
control her reproduction and that she needs externally imposed con-
trol, they seek a factual basis to support a finding of "incompetence"
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 626.
144. Id.
145. Thomas v. State, 519 So.2d 1113 (Fla. App. 1st Dist. 1988).
146. Id. at 1114. She had stolen six gold metal watches, and then struggled with a
store employee and customer who tried to stop her from fleeing. Id.
147. Id. State v. Norman, 484 So.2d 952, 953 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986) points out that
such a probation condition serves to "requireD marriage, forbid[] extramarital sex, or
mandateD contraception."
148. Norman, 484 So.2d at 952.
149. Id. at 953.
150. See supra notes 53-69 and accompanying text.
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that will justify that control. Simpson, and incompetence by virtue of
mental weakness and sexual promiscuity, represent one point on a
continuum of judicial notions of maternal responsibility. Dominguez,
Norman, and lack of control evidenced by maternal irresponsibility,
occupy another point. All the cases involving unwed mothers and
incompetence by virtue of immorality occupy another such point.
Finally, bearing children out-of-wedlock and incompetence by virtue
of fiscal irresponsibility, occupies yet another.
The theme of the single-mother-of-ilegitimate-children 51 re-
curs in these cases. Court orders prohibiting pregnancy, whether
aimed at a woman who has abused her child, or at a woman charged
with a crime unrelated to child abuse, illustrate that the issues of a
woman's marital status and whether or not she and her children
receive public assistance are continually intertwined with concerns
about women's mothering.'52 Fourteen of the sixteen women identi-
fied as having been subjected to probation conditions barring pro-
creation were unmarried. 53
Judicial focus on single motherhood is an essential predicate to
the creation and perpetuation of the mother/body myth. The single
mother raises judicial ire, and yet fathers' absences are not explicitly
addressed by the courts. The lack of a restraining male influence
151. Martha Fineman observes that, rather than targeting the root problem-pov-
erty-social reform efforts have targeted family structure. Such efforts seek to attach a
man to each single woman as a solution to the problem. Martha Fineman, Images of
Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE L. REV. 274. Fineman writes:
The imagery of welfare discourse... remains laden with moral and normative
judgments that are founded upon stereotypical assumptions about single moth-
ers in the poverty context. The decisions to become or remain a single mother,
particularly when undertaken by a woman who has never been married, is the
decisive issue for whether one is to be considered a good mother.
Id. at 281-82.
Clarice Feinman notes that single women have historically been treated differently
than married women for chid abuse related crimes. Historically, married women and sin-
gle women have been punished differently for crimes against their children. For instance,
in thirteenth and fourteenth century England, women accused of infanticide, if married
and living with their husbands, were rarely punished by more than a public reprimand.
By contrast, if a woman were unmarried, she might be accused of being a witch and be
stoned to death or buried alive. See CLARICE FEINMAN, WOMEN IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 5 (2nd ed. 1986).
152. One woman, jailed after violating her probation condition that she not give birth
to an illegitimate child, was reprimanded by the sentencing judge for "continu[ing] to
bring into life these unfortunate children without the benefit of a legal father." Paul, su-
pra note 74, at 86 n.14. The sentencing judge called the violation of probation "vicious in
its nature." Id.
153. See supra note 88. The exceptions are Melinda Middleton and Debra Ann
Williams. See Convicted Child Abuser Undergoes Court-Suggested Sterilization, supra
note 88 (noting that Middleton is married); Feeley, supra note 88, at 61 (noting that
Williams is married).
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seems to incite the court's impulse to subject women to extra meas-
ures of control. The courts appear to reason that because women need
assistance in controlling their bodies, and no husband/father is
performing that function, the State must intervene. In this situation,
the court itself assumes the parental role.
Cases such as Zaring, Dominguez, and Hernandez, where
women were ordered not to conceive because of crimes with no ap-
parent connection to the care of children, rely especially heavily on
the spectre of the "bad mother" and the mother/body myth for their
coherence. Single mothers and children born out-of-wedlock appear
to conjure up judicial visions of "bad mothers." A judge can thus
react to "facts" neither directly at issue nor criminally punishable,
such as a woman's maternal status, but incorporate those facts into
his or her view of the "bad mother" who is seen by some as an ap-
propriate target for reproductive control. The tenet of the moth-
er/body myth that all women's ills can be cured through imposition
of reproductive controls then comes into play.
The myths surrounding judicial efforts to control the maternal
body have been reinscribed in these cases. Defining the probationer
as a bad mother allows courts to cite and give weight to the attrib-
utes considered part of the socially-constructed bad mother. When
courts approach these cases from the bad mother perspective, 1 4 an
opportunity is created for courts to fill out the picture of the bad
mother. Judges go beyond what was necessary to reach the question
before them and open the inquiry into facts considered relevant to
assessing the maternal body. Once so classified, the bad mother
becomes the target for the imposition of regulatory measures focus-
ing on reproduction. The legal standard which governs the bounda-
ries of probation conditions 155 is unable to stop this dynamic from
occurring.
While the Dominquez/Lent standard156 has been a useful tool in
combating pregnancy prohibitions, it is less helpful in combating
rationales which drive the imposition of reproductive sanctions.
First, many of these cases are not appealed, 157 although it is possible
154. Judge Broadman, who sentenced Darlene Johnson to Norplant said: "[HIere
we're charged here with bad parent." Judgment Proceedings at 5, People v. Johnson, No.
29390 (Cal. Super. Ct. Tulare County Jan. 2, 1991) [hereinafter Judgment Proceedings].
See infra section II.C.2.b for discussion of People v. Johnson.
155. See generally Parker, supra note 88.
156. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
157. Women who avoid prison terms by agreeing to Norplant are not likely to chal-
lenge the validity of the condition. See Lewin, supra note 7, at A20. ("This kind of thing
happens a lot in lower courts and never gets challenged because the defendant's happy
not to be in jail.") (quoting Dr. George Annas of Boston University). Perhaps this is part
of the reason why judges continue to impose such conditions.
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that sentencing judges consider the standard and that, but for the
standard, there would be many more cases of court-ordered contra-
ception. It is more probable that from the trial court's perspective,
because of the view that the judge is likely to have of the woman
affected and because what is at issue for him or her is the woman's
"bad mothering," that a reproduction-oriented penalty will seem
fitting. On appeal, since the issue is the validity of the trial court's
order, the woman is no longer as visible. Thus, the winnowing char-
acter of the appellate process may make it easier for appellate courts
to see a disjuncture between the crime committed and the penalty
imposed.
Second, the standard can be effective only insofar as
"unrelated" considerations are evident from the type of condition
ordered. Typically, however, the thinking that has preceded the
order remains invisible and is untouched, perhaps explaining the
persistence of these measures in the face of repeated appellate re-
versals. Third, the legal standard begs the question of how to decide
what is and is not reasonably related to the crime of child abuse, and
of what role myths play in resolving questions of law. While
probation conditions forbidding procreation have been reversed on
appeal, in other words, the legal test repudiates the result, but not
the thinking that engendered the result.'58
C. The Norplant Measures
Eugenically-motivated policies have fallen into disfavor; most
laws permitting eugenic considerations in ordering sterilization
have been repealed or judicially invalidated.159 Similarly, when trial
courts have ordered probationers not to get pregnant, reviewing
courts have uniformly reversed them."' Yet the myths that pervade
those measures are present in the Norplant measures; what has been
rejected, then, has been the means, not the myths that inform them.
To date, five women have been ordered to undergo Norplant
implantation as punishment for child abuse, although judges have
considered making such an order in at least three additional
cases. 16' Norplant has also been the focus of twenty bills in thirteen
states, many of which proposed that Norplant implantation be made
a probation condition for fertile women convicted of drug-related
crimes, or that fertile women receiving public assistance be offered
158. See infra notes 414-17 and accompanying text for further discussion of this
point.
159. See REILLY, supra note 44, at 160 ("Mhe era of involuntary sterilization for
eugenic reasons seems over.").
160. See cases cited supra note 8G.
161. See infra notes 186-217.
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financial incentives in the form of cash bonuses for Norplant use. 162
Such orders and bills continued to be made and proposed.63
1. The Norplant Contraceptive Device. Norplant' 64 consists of six16
match-stick size silastic rods or capsules 66 that are surgically in-
serted in a woman's upper arm. 67 Implantation takes ten to fifteen
minutes and requires a local anesthetic.' Once implanted, Norplant
is effective for five years, after which time it must be removed.' 69
Removal is more difficult and time consuming than insertion, some-
times requiring repeated attempts.70
Norplant is ninety-nine percent effective in preventing preg-
nancy. 1' Its sterilizing effects are allegedly completely reversible;
162. Norplant: Opportunities and Perils for Low-Income Women, (Alan Guttmacher
Inst., Washington, D.C.), Dec. 1992, at 1, 3 (Special Rep. #1) [hereinafter Alan
Guttmacher Institute Special Report].
163. See infra notes 216-18 and accompanying text for the most recent Norplant
order. See infra notes 297-99 and accompanying text for the most recent bills enlisting
Norplant.
164. Norplant was developed by The Population Council, a non-profit organization
devoted to developing family planning methods, Nicole Wise, Norplant Met by
'Overwhelming Demand,' N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1992, at 3, and is manufactured in Finland.
Julia R. Scott, Norplant and Women of Color, in NoRPLANT AND POOR WOMEN, supra note
17, at 40. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, a division of American Home Products Corporation,
markets Norplant in the United States. Wise, supra.
165. Research is underway to reduce the number of rods to two. Tamar Lewin, 5-
Year Contraceptive Implant Seems Headed for Wide Use, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1991, at
Al, A26.
166. The capsules are made of silicone rubber. Sheldon J. Segal, The Development of
Norplant Implants, 14 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 159, 159 (June-July 1983) (special issue devoted
to Norplant). Each rod contains 36 milligrams of the synthetic hormone levonorgestrel (a
progestin), the same hormone used in some oral contraceptives. WYETH-AYERST LABS.,
NORPLANT SYSTEM CONSUMER INFORMATION 4 (1991) [hereinafter NORPLANT CONSUMER
INFORMATION]. The hormone in the device suppresses ovulation and thickens the mucus
lining of the cervix, inhibiting sperm from entering the cervical canal. Segal, supra, at
161.
167. NOIPLANT CONSUMER INFORMATION, supra note 166, at 4.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 8. Research is currently being conducted to develop a biodegradable
implant that will eliminate the need for removal. ROBERT H. BLANK, REGULATING
REPRODUCTION 51 (1990); see also Bernadine Healy, Research Progress on New and Better
Methods for Family Planning, 268 JAMA 1248 (1992).
170. NORPLANT CONSUMER INFORMATION, supra note 166, at 8. "Fibrous sheaths
form around the Norplant capsules in a very short amount of time, and you have to liter-
ally dissect the Norplant away from the tissue, which is difficult, time-consuming, and
frustrating." Wise, supra note 164, at 3.
171. Thuan Le, Norplant Birth Control Available in July, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 1991,
at B7. Norplant's failure rate is 0.3% to 0.6% in one year and 1.5% over five years. Long-
Acting Contraceptives, supra note 17, at 1818. Studies indicate, however, that Norplant's
effectiveness decreases over the five year period. Irving Sivin, Norplant Clinical Trials, in
NORPLANT AND POOR WOMEN, supra note 17, at 4-5. Norplant is the most effective birth
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fertility purportedly returns within twenty-four to forty-eight hours
following removal.172 The total cost of Norplant is approximately
$1000; Norplant itself costs $365, and insertion and removal cost
$500 and $200, respectively.'
Norplant use may cause side effects: changes in menstrual
bleeding,'74 headaches, nervousness, nausea, dizziness, ovarian or
fallopian tube enlargement, weight gain, hair loss or excessive hair
growth and acne.'75 In addition, Norplant is contraindicated for
women with acute liver disease, breast cancer or blood clots'76 and
Norplant users with high blood pressure should be closely moni-
tored.177
Several of Norplant's attributes likely contribute to its attrac-
tiveness to judges and legislators. The temporary nature of
Norplant's contraceptive effects shields it from the political liabili-
ties associated with other reproductive sanctions; Norplant is per-
ceived as an acceptable alternative to permanent sterilization.7 8 A
technological development with the stamp of FDA approval, Norplant
may be perceived as a more humane way of achieving the same goals
some of the sterilization policies discussed in Section I.A were
intended to serve.17 9 Against the backdrop of the not-too-distant
past, Norplant could be seen as a step forward for women; instead of
being criticized for overreaching into the sphere of reproductive
choice, the State may be complimented for its restraint.
The warfare mentality of current policy initiatives against
control method other than male sterilization. Daniel M. Weintraub, Medi-Cal Offers
Norplant Birth Control, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1992, at A23.
172. Wise, supra note 164, at 3.
173. Reshnma Menon, The Double-edged Sword ofNorplant, CM. TRIB., Jan. 24, 1993,
at 11, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CHTRIB File.
174. Wise, supra note 164, at 3. According to one study, as many as eighty-two
percent of women experienced changes in menstrual bleeding. Steven Findlay, Birth
Control, U.S. WORLD & NEWS REP., Dec. 24, 1990, at 58, 59.
175. NORPLANT CONSUMER INFORMATION, supra note 166, at 14-15.
176. Id. at-10.
177. WYETH-AYERsT LABS., NORPLANT SYSTEM PRESCRIBING INFORmATION (1990).
Pregnant women should not be implanted with Norplant, and implantation is generally
not advisable for lactating women. Id.
178. Advocates of the Norplant measures hasten to distinguish it from sterilization.
For instance, in conditioning Darlene Johnson's probation on implantation with Norplant,
Judge Broadman said: 'This is. not forced sterilization. That went out in the 40's."
Judgment Proceedings supra note 154, at 8. See infra section H.C.2.b for discussion of
People v. Johnson.
However, if a probationer, age thirty-five, is implanted with Norplant and told she
must keep it in place for five years, she may be rendered sterile, if by the end of the pro-
bationary term she is no longer able to conceive.
179. A possible advantage of Norplant's availability may be that those disposed to
coercing women to undergo sterilization will turn to Norplant instead.
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drugs, crime and poverty has fostered the perception that bolder
measures for attacking those problems are needed and warranted.
Norplant's reputation as a technological breakthrough helps legiti-
mize its use-it is seen as a sophisticated tool for ameliorating com-
plex problems. The apparent ease with which Norplant is invoked by
politicians who normally would exercise caution in endorsing poten-
tially unpopular initiatives 80 reflects not only the sense that people
are willing to entertain radical ideas, but also, more fundamentally,
the idea that the Norplant measures are benign. 8' Public opinion
also favors the Norplant measures, thereby furthering-their political
palatability. 182
Norplant is ideally suited for the probation and welfare con-
texts. Since its presence can be easily detected by sight or touch,
women can be monitored for compliance with court orders or finan-
cial incentive requirements." Norplant enables the State to surveil
women in a way that would not be possible with other types of birth
180. Governor Donald Schaefer of Maryland, for instance, has expressed interest in
requiring women on welfare to be implanted with Norplant as a condition of receiving as-
sistance. Governor's Welfare Plan Pushes Free Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1993,
at 27.
181. Judge Broadman admonished Johnson's counsel that the decision to implant
Johnson "must be kept in perspective"; after all, judges make decisions every day that
significantly affect the lives of the individuals before them. Motion to Modify Sentence at
24, People v. Johnson, No. 29390 (Cal. Super. Ct. Tulare County Jan. 10, 1991)
[hereinafter Motion to Modify]. See infra section II.C.2.b for discussion of People v.
Johnson.
182. Forty-seven percent of respondents to a mail-in poll conducted by Glamour
magazine thought women receiving public assistance should be offered financial
incentives to use Norplant, and fifty-five percent supported mandatory Norplant use for
women convicted of child abuse. Coale, supra note 9, at 190 n.10 (citing This is What You
Thought, GLAMOUR, July 1991, at 101). Another poll that questioned 1,679 Californians,
found that more than sixty percent felt Norplant should be mandatory for women who
abuse drugs. That position was taken by sixty-four percent of the women polled, seven of
every ten Latinos questioned and six of every ten African-Americans and whites. Half of
all African-Americans and more than half of Latinos 'strongly approve' the concept.
George Skelton & Daniel M. Weintraub, The Times Poll: Most Support Norplant For
Teens, Drug Addicts, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 1991, at Al. In Visalia, California, there was
"widespread community support" for Judge Broadman's decision to order Darlene
Johnson to be implanted with Norplant. John Hurst, Controversial Judge Dodges Not
Only Critics But Bullet, LA. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1991, at A3.
It is interesting to compare the 1991 poll data with similar poll data collected in 1965
by Gallup. That poll asked: "'Sometimes unwed mothers on relief continue to have
illegitimate children and get relief money for each new child born. What do you think
should be done in the case of these women?,'" Paul, supra note 74, at 99-100 (quoting the
poll results published in the WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1965, at 2A). Approximately half of
those surveyed thought that the women should be refused any further assistance, and one
out of every five suggested sterilization. Id. at 100.
183. See NORPLANT CONSUMER INFORMATION, supra note 166, at 7.
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control.'" Two additional factors make Norplant an attractive choice
in the probation context. First, only a trained practitioner can re-
move Norplant from a woman's arm. Norplant is thus optimally
designed for enforcement purposes. Second, Norplant's effectiveness
at preventing pregnancy may prompt judicial and legislative reli-
ance upon it. Norplant offers an appealing alternative to the severity
of sterilization and the inefficacy of unenforceable directives forbid-
ding conception.1
2. Norplant and the Judiciary. Since early 1991, when Norplant
began to be distributed in the United States, five women charged
with child abuse have accepted Norplant as a condition of proba-
tion. ' Another woman refused Norplant as a probation condition 8 7
and one judge rejected a defense attorney's suggestion that Norplant
be offered as an alternative to jail." The eighth instance of
Norplant arose in a child custody hearing in which the judge report-
184. Arthur, supra note 17, at 86-93 (contrasting the enforceability of court orders to
use Norplant with court orders to use other types of birth control).
Norplant's utility as an instrument of surveillance has often been noted. See, e.g.,
Lewin, supra note 7, at A20 (quoting Dr. George Annas of Boston University's School of
Medicine) ("'Norplant presents a special temptation to judges because it's so long lasting
and doesn't require any cooperation after it's implanted, and can be monitored by a parole
officer just by looking at the woman's arm.'"); Lewin, supra note 165, at A26 ("[Tihe pres-
ence of Norplant could easily be monitored by a parole officer or welfare official, anxious
to prevent further pregnancies in a convicted child-abuser, a woman who carried the
AIDS virus or a woman already receiving public assistance."); Arthur, supra note 17, at
93.
185. In addition, a judge hesitating to mandate birth control because he or she fears
it could encourage abortion (if a probationer, due to birth control failure, were to conceive
and thereby violate the court order, she might feel that abortion was her only means of
avoiding jail) might be reassured by Norplant's high rate of effectiveness. The court in
People v. Pointer expressed this concern. 151 Cal. App. 3d 1128, 1140 (Ct. App. 1st Dist.
1984).
186. See Abusive Mother Accepts Contraceptive Implant, CHI. TRB. Feb. 10, 1993, at
3 (Lisa Smith, sentenced in February, 1993); John Makeig, Surgical Deterrent; Mom
Convicted of Child Abuse Picks Birth-Control Implant Over Prison, HOUS. CHRON., Mar.
6, 1992, at Al (Ida Jean Tovar, sentenced in April, 1991); Judge Orders Woman to be
Given Contraceptive, UPI, Sept. 6, 1991, available in LEXIS Nexis Library, UPI File
(Cathy Lanel Knighten, sentenced in September, 1991); People v. Johnson, No. 29390
(Cal. Super. Ct. Tulare County 1990) (Darlene Johnson, sentenced in January, 1991). Not
all of these women ended up getting the implant, however. The court in Carlton's case
later changed the Norplant order, requiring instead that Carlton practice birth control,
leaving the type of birth control unspecified. See Arthur, supra note 17, at 19 n.106, 21.
Darlene Johnson accepted the Norplant condition, but subsequently challenged the order,
and the condition was stayed pending appeal. See infra note 241.
187. See People v. Garza, No. 29794 (Cal. Super. Ct. Tulare County 1991), appeal
docketed, F016212 (Cal. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1991).
188. Mack Reed, Judge Sentences Mother of Slain Baby to Prison, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8,
1992, at B5.
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edly is considering ordering Norplant.5 9
a. The Norplant Cases to Date. Although each of these cases
raise slightly different legal questions, they all resemble the invol-
untary sterilization and court-ordered contraception cases. Similar
facts and reasoning recur. 190 A brief review of the Norplant cases will
reveal who is subjected to court-ordered Norplant, who requests it,
and the range of issues its enlistment raises. Thereafter the case of
People v. Johnson, which is in many respects representative of the
Norplant cases, is explored in detail.
Judge Howard Broadman offered Norplant as an alternative to
jail to Norma Duran Garza, who had been convicted by a jury of
felony child abuse.' After Garza refused Norplant because birth
control violated her religious beliefs, 92 the court imposed a state
prison sentence of four years, despite the probation department's
recommendation that Garza only be sentenced to three hundred and
sixty days in local jail followed by a probation term.193 Garza's case
raises the possibility that judges may increase the stakes in such
cases in order to get women to make the choices the judges want
them to make."
189. Judge Finds No Legal Precedent for Ordering Contraception, UPI, Nov. 14,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
190. Aside from Johnson's and Garza's cases, this information has been taken from
media accounts and a law review article. My information thus is at best second hand and
lacks the texts of the judge's own words. It would be interesting to compare the court re-
cords, where available, of the Norplant cases, to see how the issues are discussed in the
parties' own terms.
191. Appellants Opening Brief at 9, People v. Garza, No. 29794 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Tulare County 1991), appeal docketed, No. F016212 (Cal. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1991)
[hereinafter Appellants Opening Brief (Garza)]. At trial, evidence was introduced that
Garza had burned her son's hand on the stove, hit him with a belt, extension cord, and
high-heeled shoe. Id. at 5. "How, when and where these injuries were inflicted, and by
whom, was hotly contested." Id. Garza was reported to the police by her husband, who
filed for exclusive custody of Garza's son. Id. at 4. Garza's husband was neither the bio-
logical nor adoptive father of Garza's son. Id. at n.2.
192. Id. at 21-24. After receiving the probation report but prior to sentencing Garza,
Judge Broadman asked Garza's attorney if Garza would accept Norplant as a condition of
probation.
THE COURT- I need to know the answer to this question because it looms in
the horizon, and I just want to get this cat out of the bag once and for all right
now, since we're all thinking but no one is saying it. Does this defendant have
any interest in the - as a condition of probation, Norplant?
[GARZA'S ATTORNEY]: No.
THE COURT: No?
[GARZA'S ATTORNEY]: No.
THE COURT: Ok.
Id. (quoting Reporter's Transcript, June 10, 1991).
193. Respondent's Brief at 1, People v. Garza, F016212 (Cal. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1991).
194. The court's action is being appealed. Garza's attorneys are arguing that the
court sentenced her to a long state prison term in reaction to her refusal of Norplant, as
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Michelle Carlton was charged with felony child abuse for al-
lowing her infant son to die after her boyfriend had violently shaken
him.9 5 The boyfriend received a five year sentence,196 and Carlton
was sentenced to a minimum term in county jail and two years pro-
bation for failing to prevent her son's death.9 7 Further, the judge
ordered Carlton '[not] to conceive any children while on probation
unless approved by the Court,' and commanded her to '[olbtain the
Norplant System (or similar implant) birth control.'" 9
Twenty-three year-old Cathy Lanel Knighten pled guilty to
injuring her daughter; 9 Knighten, the mother of three, was video-
taped at Texas Children's Hospital trying to suffocate her daugh-
ter.00 Judge Shaver sentenced Knighten to ten years probation,
forbade her to have unsupervised contact with children under the
age of fourteen, and required that she be implanted with
Norplant. 0' Knighten was implanted, but had an adverse medical
reaction to the device. 02 Thereafter she underwent a tubal ligation
20 3
without conferring with the court as to possible alternatives.0 "
Another Texas woman, Ida Jean Tovar, consented to Norplant im-
plantation and ten years of probation.20 5 Tovar, who was charged
with shaking her two-month old son so severely that he incurred
brain damage, agreed to the condition rather than serve a ten-year
prison sentence.2 6
well as that the Norplant condition violates Garza's first amendment right to free exercise
of religion. Appellant's Opening Brief (Garza), supra note 191, at 21-24. See also Long-
Acting Contraceptives, supra note 17, at 1820 (noting that "[i]n some cases in which incar-
ceration ordinarily would not even be a possibility, the prosecutor could threaten
incarceration to ensure that contraception was accepted.").
195. Arthur, supra note 17, at 19-20.
196. Id at 20.
197. Id.
198. Id. (quoting Order of Probation at 2, State v. Carlton, No. CR90-1937 (Neb.
County Ct. Lincoln County 1991)).
199. Judge Orders Woman to be Given Contraceptive, supra note 186.
200. Id.
201. Id. Knighten was also required to attend mental health counseling and parent-
ing classes. Id.
202. Rosenblum, supra note 17, at 276.
203. A tubal ligation is an operation in which a woman's fallopian tubes are blocked.
BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK COLLECTIVE, THE NEW OUR BODIES, OURSELVES 257-58
(1984) [hereinafter THE NEW OUR BODIES, OURSELVES]. This may be done by burning or
cutting the tubes, clipping them shut, or applying rings to them. Id. at 258. It is a
generally non-reversible sterilization method. Major complications from surgery are un-
common, but possible. Id.
204. See Rosenblum, supra note 17, at 276.
205. Makeig, supra note 186, at Al. It is unclear from the report whether the
Norplant condition would extend for the duration of probation. If so, this would require
two implantations, as Norplant must be removed after five years of use.
206. Id.
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When a jury convicted twenty-three year-old. Francisca Maria
Sanchez of second-degree murder for drowning her newborn son, °7
Sanchez's attorney requested that the judge grant her probation
with Norplant as an alternative to jail.208 The Deputy District
Attorney argued that "probation would be too lenient and the
Norplant contraceptive inhumane. 09 Judge Lawrence Storch agreed
that probation would be an inappropriate punishment for murder,
and sentenced Sanchez to fifteen years to life in prison.210
The issue of Norplant implantation has also surfaced in a child
custody hearing.21" ' Thirty six year-old Crystal Gayle Jones is cur-
rently responding to an action brought by the Florida Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services to declare her an "unfit mother"
and to remove her infant son from her custody. - Jones' neighbors
signed petitions requesting that the judge have Jones sterilized, in
addition to removing her son from her custody. 13 Then child advo-
cacy group Valuing our Children and Law of Jacksonville (VOCAL)
then expressed its view that Jones should be implanted with
Norplant, and filed a motion to become a party to the case in order
to pursue that demand. 4 The judge granted VOCAL's motion to join
the case, but stated that he could find no legal precedent for order-
ing contraception under such circumstances.2 5
Most recently, Lisa Smith was ordered to use Norplant as part
of her sentence for aggravated battery.216 Smith, who was angry with
her boyfriend, vented her frustration by hitting her four week-old
207. Reed, supra note 188, at B5. Sanchez had also been charged with attempted-
murder for trying to flush another newborn son down the toilet in her home, fourteen
months earlier; Sanchez was acquitted of those charges. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. The judge did so while acknowledging that Sanchez did not pose a threat to
the community "outside the danger to future unborn children." Id.
211. Judge Finds no Legal Precedent for Ordering Contraception, supra note 189.
212. Id. Three of Jones' children had already been removed from her custody in
response to charges of emotional and physical abuse. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. A hearing on this issue is scheduled. Id.
216. Abusive Mother Accepts Contraceptive Implant, supra note 186, at 3. In addition
to her three and a half year probationary term, Smith must serve a six month jail term
and perform community service. Id. Smith has a one-year old child who is in permanent
custody of the state; the one-month old child is now also in state custody. Id. Judge
Dozier, who presided over the case, stated: "There is [sic] an awful lot of things she needs
to learn and prove she has learned before she should ever have the opportunity to ever
parent another child." Id. Media reports, however, have not indicated that Smith will re-
ceive any counseling or parenting classes. If Norplant is ordered without therapeutic in-
tervention, its truly punitive intention becomes more obvious; it is difficult to see how
Norplant alone could aid in the probationer's rehabilitation.
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child on the head with a toy music box. 217 While no Norplant order
has yet been reviewed by an appellate court, the American Civil
Liberties Union will challenge Lisa Smith's Norplant probation
condition.218
b. People v. Johnson. Darlene Johnson was the first woman
to be sentenced to probation conditioned on acceptance of Norplant.
Johnson, charged with hitting her two eldest daughters with a belt
and an electric cord,219 pled guilty to "three counts of inflicting corpo-
ral injury upon a child resulting in a traumatic condition."220 At the
time of her plea, Johnson was twenty-seven years old, had four chil-
dren, and was pregnant with a fifth child.22' She was on welfare and
had never been married.222 While her prior record disclosed convic-
tions for theft, forgery and assault and battery,22 Johnson had no
previous convictions for child abuse.22 Facing a maximum state
prison sentence of seven years, Johnson entered her request for pro-
bation.2" Judge Howard R. Broadman of Tulare County Superior
Court, Visalia, California, stated that he was "going to try and
think... of some special probation conditions for this lady ..... 226
The judge first remanded Johnson to jail for the month between
the plea hearing and- sentencing hearing because he feared that
Johnson might use drugs and jeopardize her pregnancy if she were
released from custody,227 even though there was no evidence in the
record that Johnson used drugs.228 Judge Broadman told Johnson:
"You're going to have this baby under the auspices of the jail and
217. ACLU will challenge Norplant Sentence, UPI, Feb. 11, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File.
218. Id.
219. Appellant's Opening Brief at 2, People v. Johnson, No. 29390 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Tulare County 1990), appeal docketed, No. F015316 (Cal. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1991)
[hereinafter Appellants Opening Brief]. Significantly, at the sentencing hearing, Judge
Broadman put his own label on the charge: "[Hiere we're charged with bad parent."
Judgment Proceedings, supra note 154, at 5.
220. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 219, at 2.
221. Johnson retained parental rights as to her three daughters, all in foster care,
and one son, who lived with his grandparents at the time of the sentencing hearing.
Judgment Proceedings, supra note 154, at 11.
222. 60 Minutes: Norplant (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 10, 1991) (page citations
refer to transcript on file with the Buffalo Law Review) [hereinafter 60 Minutes].
223. Id. at 7. Johnson had served a year and a half in state prison. Id.
224. Judgment Proceedings, supra note 154, at 2. Judge Broadman stated at the
sentencing hearing that he chose not to send Johnson to state prison because her prior of-
fenses were not related to child abuse. Id.
225. Appellants Opening Brief, supra note 219, at 10. In Johnson's case it seems
that, at most, she would have been sentenced to four years in state prison. Motion to
Modify, supra note 181, at 3, 4.
226. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 219, at 7.
227. Judgment Proceedings, supra note 154, at 3-4.
228. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 219, at 8 n.7.
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however they do it. Do not send me over a request to be released to
have the baby. I'm not going to do that."229 Johnson was also ordered
to inform the judge how much her baby weighed at birth."'
At the sentencing hearing, the court granted Johnson's applica-
tion for probation and suspended her jail sentence for three years,
considering those years her probation term.2 31 The court then sen-
tenced Johnson to a year in county jail 2 and imposed several proba-
tion conditions. Johnson was ordered to attend parenting classes
and mental health counseling, 3 forbidden to discipline her children
by striking them,- and directed to refrain from ingesting alcohol or
smoking cigarettes for the duration of her pregnancy.235 Judge
Broadman explained: "I also ordered her not to smoke cigarettes as a
condition of being on probation. I told her that since she was preg-
nant, if she got caught smoking, I was going to send her to prison
and take away the baby." 36
Judge Broadman then directed that Johnson be implanted with
Norplant.2
7
THE COURT: Are you on welfare?
JOHNSON: I was.
THE COURT: Okay. And you will be again, right?
JOHNSON: Yeah.
THE COURT: Do-you want to get pregnant again?
JOHNSON: No.
THE COURT: Okay. As a condition of your probation, you know, this
new thing that's going to be available next month, you probably haven't
heard about it. It's called Norplant.
JOHNSON: No.
THE COURT: It's a thing you put into your arm and it lasts for five
years. You can't get-it's like birth control pills except you don't have to
take them everyday. IfI order that as a condition of your probation,
then maybe MediCal or Medicare will pay for that.
JOHNSON: Is it harmful to the body?
229. Id. at 8.
230. Judgment Proceedings, supra note 154, at 13.
231. Id. at 6.
232. Id. at 8; Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 219, at 2.
233. Judgment Proceedings, supra note 154, at 9.
234. Id.
235. Id. Judge Broadman had indicated at the plea hearing that he would be impos-
ing these conditions of probation, but did not mention an intention to order birth control.
Id. at 8.
236. Id. at 8 n.6.
237. Id. at 7; Respondent's Supplemental Brief, at 1, People v. Johnson, No. 29390
(Cal. Super. Ct. Tulare County 1990), appeal docketed, No. F015316 (Cal. Ct. App. 5th
Dist. 1991) [hereinafter Respondents Supplemental Briefl. Norplant was not yet on the
market. Appellants Opening Brief, supra note 219, at 9; Judgment Proceedings, supra
note 154, at 6.
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THE COURT: Well, its like a birth control pill. It's F.DA. approved.
It's not experimental. What do you think about that?
JOHNSON: Okay.
2 8
Following this exchange, Johnson consented to Norplant implanta-
tion. She "okayed" the probation condition before the court indicated
that Norplant's sterilization effects were temporary.29
Johnson changed her mind about the Norplant condition five
days later and filed a motion to reconsider 40 The court denied her
motion,2 1 finding that her consent to Norplant was "willing, know-
ing [and] voluntary"12 and that "the rights of [her] unconceived
children were paramount 3 and "superseded [her] constitutional
right" to procreate. ' In justifying his refusal to modify the order,
Judge Broadman stressed the physical injury inflicted on Johnson's
children 5 and his view that prohibiting Johnson from conceiving
additional children was essential to her rehabilitation, as it would
reduce her stress level.2
6
238. Judgment Proceedings, supra note 154, at 13.
239. Id. In fact it was Johnson's attorney who thought to make sure that Norplant's
sterilization effects were reversible. Motion to Modify, supra note 181, at 14.
240. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 204, at 11.
241. Id. at 24. Johnson appealed the order denying her motion to modify, and the
court granted Johnson's application for a stay of the Norplant condition pending the out-
come of her appeal of the condition. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 219, at 3 n.2.
The appeal was later dismissed, however, because Johnson violated the terms of her pro-
bation prohibiting drug use (ten months after sentencing, Johnson had agreed to a drug
test and tested positive for cocaine), and her terms and conditions of probation were modi-
fied to include a drug component. Dave Cooper, Woman in Norplant Case Ordered Back
for Sentencing, Gannett News Service, Dec. 20, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
GNS File. Johnson later violated the drug probation condition and was sentenced to five
years in prison, rendering moot the Norplant condition. Birth Curb Order is Declared
Moot, N.Y. TImEs, Apr. 15, 1992, at A23.
242. Motion to Modify, supra note 181, at 17. It should be noted that the State of
California subsequently conceded that Johnson's consent had not been informed.
Respondents Supplemental Brief, supra note 223, at 2.
243. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 219, at 12.
244. Id. While the court acknowledged that the right to procreate is "substantial"
and "constitutionally protected," it also noted that such right is "not absolute" and "in a
proper case it can be limited." Motion to Modify, supra note 181, at 20. Judge Broadman,
justifying his decision to require Darlene Johnson to undergo implantation with Norplant
later stated: "[W]hat you have to do as a judge is, you must balance conflicting
constitutional rights. And here, what I did was, I found that there were constitutional
rights of the children, [Darlene Johnson's] born children and her unconceived children,
and I balanced their rights against her rights, and they won." 60 Minutes, supra note 222,
at 8.
245. See, e.g., Motion to Modify, supra note 181, at 18.
246. Judge Broadman stated: "[Johnson] has four children and is currently pregnant.
The stress and trauma of a sixth child on a person who is a convicted child abuser with
her record cannot but help delay or prevent her ultimate rehabilitation." Motion to
Modify, supra note 181, at 21. Judge Broadman also believed that "[t]he birth of
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c. Mapping the Myth. Johnson's profile resembles that of
many of the women previously described: a single mother, of color,
on welfare, and having several children who receive public assis-
tance.' Thus the basic pool of facts Judge Broadman had to draw
upon is a familiar one. The dynamic of the case, how it unfolded
from the initial problem-Johnson was found guilty of child abuse-
to its final disposition-Johnson was offered the choice between
Norplant implantation and a prison term, should also be familiar.
Finally, Johnson raises familiar questions: Why did Judge
Broadman ask Johnson about welfare before he asked about her
pregnancies? Why did he speculate that Johnson might harm her
fetus by using drugs when there had been no evidence of drug use?248
In sentencing Johnson to Norplant, did Judge Broadman believe 249
he was attacking the problem of child abuse at its roots?
Johnson illustrates the frequent fusion of reproductive capacity
and criminal conduct. The ease with which the two are conflated
illuminates the process by which the myths surrounding women's
maternal roles are generated. There seems to be a link between the
court's perception that Johnson is a "bad mother" and the type of
control it imposes. The Norplant sanction is designed to regulate
Johnson's ability to reproduce and to punish her for being a "bad
mother," rather than for her criminal conduct. While the severity of
Johnson's crime probably also influenced Judge Broadman's deci-
sion,2 ° if this were his only or even predominant concern, the proba-
additional children until after she has successfully completed the court-ordered mental
health counseling and parenting classes dooms her and any subsequent children to repeat
this vicious cycle." Id. at 20.
247. Precisely how many of the women whose sentences have been affected by
Norplant are women of color is difficult to determine, as news accounts and trial
testimony often do not indicate the probationer's race. It is likely, however, that the ma-
jority of women to be prosecuted for child abuse, or for exposing their fetuses to drugs,
will be women of color. See infra note 392.
248. For a similar case see United States v. Vaughn, Crim. No. F2172-88B (D.C.
Super. Ct. Aug. 23, 1988) (cited by Roberts, supra note 32, at 1431 n.54). Vaughn, a
pregnant woman who pled guilty to forgery, was imprisoned during her pregnancy
because she tested positive for cocaine. Roberts, supra note 35, at 1431, 1431 n.55 (citing
Kary Moss, Pregnant? Go Directly to Jail, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1, 1988, at 20).
249. I do not intend to hypothesize about Judge Broadman's psyche. It would, how-
ever, be interesting to know what Judge Broadman thought: Did he think he was getting
at the root of the problem of child abuse by preventing Johnson from conceiving?
250. I do not wish to suggest that there is never any true relation between the char-
acteristics courts discuss and the probationer's bad conduct, or that judges should view
behavior in a vacuum. Rather I think it is important to ask why some of their analysis
looks the way it does-why are these the additional attributes they choose to bolster their
decision? I suggest that because the judge seeks to persuade, he or she will draw upon
facts calculated to persuade-in large part because those facts were the ones he or she
found persuasive. Precisely because we share many of the same ideas and subscribe to
the same myths, we often fail to question the inclusion of these facts or the leaps made
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tion conditions imposed might have been quite different. He could
have terminated Johnson's parental rights and/or ordered her not to
have any unsupervised contact with her children. Instead, Judge
Broadman imprisoned Johnson to prevent her from using drugs,
prohibited her from engaging in prenatal conduct unhealthy to the
fetus, and directed her not to conceive. This suggests a different
judicial agenda.
The Norplant probation condition bespeaks an agenda of con-
trol ."' As this Comment has suggested, the restrictive measures
that frequently accompany probation conditions barring procreation
may be seen as attempts to offset a woman's perceived lack of self-
control, particularly in situations where there is no father or hus-
band to provide that control.'-" The prosecutor in Knighten's case,
for example, remarked that the Norplant condition could be
amended if Knighten had a "stable relationship with a man or a
loving environment for her children."t A man would presumably
assume the court's responsibility to control Knighten, at which point
the Norplant condition could be lifted. Similarly, Tracy Wilder's
attorney felt that if Wilder had "developed a stable relationship,
married, and wanted to have children, [the judge] would amend the
probation requirement." 4
Judges also try to counteract the presumed inability of women
to control themselves-derived in part from "evidence" of their
"irresponsible thinking"m -- when it appears that lack of self-re-
from them. See also infra notes 412-13 and accompanying text.
251. At times the judges' words seem to reflect their vision of themselves as
personally responsible for exerting all these levels of control. When referring later to his
decision that Johnson be implanted with Norplant, Judge Broadman said, [I] indicated
by a hand movement that I was going to be implanting [the Norplant device] in her upper
forearm." Motion to Modify, supra note 181, at 7 (emphasis added.) Judge Peter Wolf, who
sentenced Brenda Vaughn (see supra note 248), said: "Im going to keep her locked up un-
til the baby is born because she's tested positive for cocaine when she came before
me .... She's apparently an addictive personality, and I'll be darned if I'm going to have a
baby born that way." Roberts, supra note 35, at 1431 (citing Kary Moss, Pregnant? Go
Directly to Jail, A-B.A. J., Nov. 1, 1988, at 20) (emphasis added). Similarly, Judge
Broadman said in Zaring, "I'm afraid that if you get pregnant we're going to get a cocaine
or heroin addicted baby." People v. Zaring, 8 Cal. App. 4th at 368 (emphasis added). The
message Zaring's procreative punishment conveyed was, "we're not going to let that hap-
pen."
252. I use the terms "father" and "husbands" because they have traditionally been
the family disciplinarians. I recognize that both male and female judges have assumed
this role.
253. Telephone Interview with Donna Goode, Prosecutor, Harris County District
Attorney's Office, Houston, TX_ (Feb. 17, 1992).
254. Barringer, supra note 88, at 33.
255. State v. Norman, 484 So.2d 952, 953 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1986).
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straint might endanger a fetus."5 This is why Johnson was jailed
during her pregnancy. When Judge Broadman told Johnson, who
was pregnant at the time of her plea hearing, that he would want to
be told how much the baby weighed, 5 7 he may have been looking for
a way to assess whether Johnson had been engaging in any prenatal
conduct detrimental to the fetus. Melody Baldwines was also moni-
tored during her pregnancy. She was hospitalized because her in-
ability to keep food down jeopardized the health of her fetus.5 9
When hospital officials told Judge Jones that Baldwin no longer
required hospitalization, he had her transferred to the psychiatric
ward of a county hospital that performed sterilization procedures.50
In the absence of the "fetal protection" rationale, these highly
restrictive measures are justified as being in the affected woman's
best interests.2 6' The "best interests" rationale is bolstered by the
implication that the women chose to be regulated. When Judge
256. Although it is beyond the scope of this Comment, the Norplant measures are
part of a larger trend of dealing harshly and restrictively with transgressing mothers,
particularly in the area of prenatal conduct. See Symposium, Substance Use During
Pregnancy: Legal and Social Responses, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 505 (1992); James Denison,
Note, The Efficacy and Constitutionality of Criminal Punishment for Maternal Substance
Abuse, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1104 (1991); Shona B. Glink, Note, The Prosecution of Maternal
Fetal Abuse: Is this the Answer? 1991 U. ILL. REV. 533 (1991); Note, Maternal Rights and
Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminalization of"Fetal Abuse", 101 HARV. L. REV.
994 (1988); Margaret Phillips, Note, The Umbilical Cord: The New Drug Connection, 40
BUFF. L. REV. 525 (1992); Special Project: Legal Rights and Issues Surrounding
Conception, Pregnancy and Birth, 39 VAND. L. REV. 597 (1986).
For a general discussion of a similar phenomenon, see Martha Minow, Rights for the
Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1
(1986). Citing the reforms which occupied the Progressives, Minow points out that
"humanitarian concerns and paternalistic measures... became more politically palatable
when focused on children." Id. at 9. Minow elaborates:
[C]hildren simply are not the real focus of the varied laws that affect them.
Instead, other powerful social goals are the focus of these laws. Traffic safety,
control of violent crime, and regulation of abortion, for example, are social goals
in which children may have incidental roles, and the laws affecting children in
these areas actually play out political and practical debates which make chil-
dren quite bjeside the point.
Id. at 5-6.
257. Judgment Proceedings, supra note 154, at 13.
258. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
259. Judge Still Asking Woman to be Sterilized, UPI, August 4, 1988, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. A lawyer, Timothy L. Bookwalter, was appointed by
Judge Jones to represent the interests of Baldwin's fetus. Id. He advocated Baldwin's
sterilization and said: "'We can't protect [Baldwin] each time she gets pregnant. She
might kill this kid too.'" Id.
260. Id.; Joseph R. Tybor, Does Sterilizaton Fit the Crime? Woman Must Decide, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 25, 1984, at 4.
261. Barbara Feringa et al., Norplant: Potential for Coercion, in NORPLANT AND POOR
WOMEN, supra note 17, at 60 (observing that "[piroponents of [the Norplant measures]
argue that ... such 'tough love' tactics are also beneficial to the targeted women.").
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Broadman sentenced Darlene Johnson, he said: "When Miss
Johnson agreed to the birth control, she finally acknowledged that it
was the child's turn."262 That is, he found that the interests of the
children outweighed those of the mother, but then suggested that
Johnson herself decided that the childrens' interests outweighed her
own. Similarly, Melody Baldwin's attorney said, "'I think she will go
through with it.... She doesn't want to have any more children
because she is well aware of the real possibility that this kind of
thing could happen again. Though this is a real hard decision to
make, both she and I are pleased that she has some choice over her
sentencing and the control of her destiny.1" 26 The public defender in
Debra Ann William's case said of William's decision to be sterilized:
"'She's accepted responsibility for what has happened. She's ad-
dressed the problem the only way she can-by getting sterilized.' '2
By painting reproductive sanctions as the woman's choice,
criminal justice officials abdicate responsibility for their choices,
and, in characterizing the sanction as a means through which
women will gain some control over their lives, divert attention from
262. Motion to Modify, supra note 181, at 22.
263. Tybor, supra note 260, at 4. Similar arguments about defendants "choosing"
their punishment have been advanced in the context of castration for male sex offenders.
In a 1985 South Carolina case, the defendant was convicted of rape and offered a
commuted sentence if he would agree to castration. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGFTS 33 (1991). The Supreme Court of South Carolina ruled
that castration amounted to cruel and unusual punishment, and that it made no
difference that the defendant "chose" the punishment. Id.
A debate raged in Texas last year over whether a man convicted of child sexual
assault would be castrated as a condition of his probation. NAACP Wants to Stop
Defendant's Proposed Castration, UPI, Feb. 11, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
UPI File. The defendant, Steven Butler, age twenty-seven, asked to be castrated and sen-
tenced to probation, rather than face a possible term of life imprisonment. Accused Child
Abuser Opts for Castration as Alternative to Prison, UPI, Feb. 6, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. Judge McSpadden ruled to allow the castration
condition. Robert Suro, Amid Controversy, Castration Plan in Texas Rape Case Collapses,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1992, at A16. Then because no doctor would agree to perform the
surgery, Judge McFadden withdrew his approval of the condition. Judge Cancels
Approval of Rape Suspect's Castration, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1992, at A13.
It is interesting that the public generally strongly disapproved of the castration
order. Not so with Norplant. See supra note 182, for public opinion poll data on Norplant.
Philip Reilly notes that there was a discrepancy between public opinion regarding
sterilization and castration during the early twentieth century, when most of the eugenic
sterilizations were performed. REILLY, supra note 44, at 29 ("Castration was too brutal to
provide a socially acceptable solution to curbing the fecundity of the feeble-minded. In the
early 1900s, however, it provided a foil against which sterilization seemed humane and
politically more palatable.").
264. Feeley, supra note 88, at 61. It is more likely that the prosecutor believes
sterilization to be Williams' only solution than that Williams believes this is so. Note too
that it is again emphasized that the woman who is the subject of reproductive control-
here Williams-has taken responsibility- sterilization was her decision.
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their truly disempowering nature. The judge who offered Baldwin
the option of sterilization for a reduced prison term said: "'Here is a
woman who should not be a mother, someone who has killed her
child and pleaded guilty to neglect. I think she needs to recognize
that the same thing can happen again and take steps to control that
it doesn't." 265 This is significant for two reasons. First, the imposi-
tion of reproductive control suggests that the judge saw these two
issues-abuse and reproduction-as one issue. Second, this regula-
tory intervention actually usurps a woman's control in the name of
offering her control. Note that the judge did not encourage Baldwin
to take steps to control her child abuse; he took steps to control her
reproduction.
Some criminal justice officials admit that they like Norplant
because of the measure of control it affords them. The judge in Ida
Jean Tovar's case stated: "It was my idea. I felt like [the crime] was
worth 10 years in the penitentiary, but I'm also very aware of the
early release problem.' 266 He feared that a ten year sentence might
have meant two years of actual jail time, and "an early release
'without much supervision.' 6 7 Similarly, Cathy Knighten's prosecu-
tor stressed that probation with Norplant rather than a jail term al-
lowed the State to maintain jurisdiction over Knighten; via the
Norplant condition the State would "have some control over these
people."268 The prosecutor described Knighten as already having "too
much responsibility," which was detrimental to her own life and to
the lives of her children. 9
When a woman has any of the "component characteristics" of
the "bad mother"--if she is a single mother, or has illegitimate chil-
dren, or receives welfare-she is likely to be seen as a bad mother in
the eyes of the judge. These characteristics are cues that appear to
persuade courts that broad, far-reaching intervention is needed.
What of the truth that these "component characteristics" are often
found together-that Johnson was on welfare, as Judge Broadman
265. Tybor, supra note 260, at 4 (quoting Marion County Superior Court Judge Roy
Jones).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Telephone Interview with Donna Goode, supra note 253. Recall that Judge
Jensen in Melinda Middleton's case also used the phrase "these people." See supra text
preceding note 110.
269. Telephone interview with Donna Goode, supra note 253. Conversely, the prose-
cutor in Francisca Maria Sanchez's case argued that the Norplant condition was not suffi-
ciently monitorable and that jail was preferable. The prosecutor argued that the Norplant
condition would be difficult to monitor: "We can't be sure if we put an implant in her that
she'd take (the) bus to Tijuana and that thing would be out in a week." Id. Under her jail
sentence, Sanchez would be eligible for parole in ten years, assuming time off for good
behavior. Id.
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suspected, and that she did ultimately use drugs, as Judge
Broadman anticipated?"7 Race and poverty,27' and poverty and single
motherhood, 72 do frequently coincide. As noted earlier, myths are
comprised of fact and fiction. The dual nature of myths is precisely
what makes them so beguiling and elusive, and allows them to be
perpetuated unthinkingly as often as intentionally.
3. Norplant and the Legislature.
a. Proposed Legislation Authorizing Court-Ordered
Norplant. Several state legislatures have considered bills, none of
which has been approved, authorizing courts to impose Norplant as
punishment for drug related offenses. Kansas Representative Kerry
Patrick introduced a bill to authorize Norplant as a probation condi-
tion. The measure, which died in committee, required fertile women
convicted of violating the Uniform Controlled Substances Act 273 to be
implanted with Norplant or a "finctionally equivalent contracep-
tive" to remain in place for twelve months. 274 Similarly, during de-
bate in the Colorado House of a "catch-all crime bill," an amendment
to permit judges to order women convicted of drug offenses to be
implanted with Norplant was proposed and rejected.275
Bills providing for Norplant implantation of drug-addicted
women who give birth to drug-addicted children were introduced in
Ohio, South Carolina and WashingtonY.2 6 The Ohio bill proposed
270. See supra note 241.
271. In the United States, fifty-six percent of all black women and fifty-one percent of
all Hispanic women aged fifteen to forty-four have family incomes below 200 percent of
poverty. Jacqueline D. Forrest, Norplant and Poor Women, in NORPLANT AND POOR
WOMEN, supra note 17, at 22.
272. "F]ifty-two percent of formerly married women and forty-four percent of never
married women (who are not currently in a cohabitating relationship) fall below 200 per-
cent of poverty... ." Id.
273. The Uniform Controlled Substances Act illegalizes the possession and sale of
controlled substances. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4127a (1985).
274. Kan. H.B. 2255, 74th Leg., 2d Sess. (1991). The proposed measure would have
required courts to order the defendant,
if the defendant is a woman who is able to become piegnant and such defendant
has been convicted of KIS.A. 65-4127a, and amendments thereto, to be im-
planted with the Norplant contraceptive implant, or another functionally
equivalent contraceptive which provides similar long-lasting pregnancy preven-
tion, which has been approved by the secretary of social and rehabilitation serv-
ices. The implant shall be removed from the defendant after 12 months of ran-
dom drug testing in which such tests were returned negative. Such defendant
shall not be subject to this section if a person licensed to practice medicine and
surgery issues a statement that the defendant is medically unable to be im-
planted with such contraceptive.
Id.
275. See Alan Guttmacher Institute Special Report, supra note 162, at 4.
276. Id. at 3-4. Governor Pete Wilson of California has also considered a plan which
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Norplant implantation as punishment for substance abuse during
pregnancy. 7 7 Following a first offense a woman could choose either
to enroll in a drug treatment program or to be implanted with
Norplant.2 7 After a second offense, Norplant implantation became
mandatory. 9 The Washington measure would have granted courts
the authority to mandate Norplant implantation of any woman who
gave birth to a child suffering from fetal alcohol syndrome or drug
addiction.8 The bill would also have permitted women to be invol-
untarily institutionalized for a diagnostic examination.281 The South
Carolina legislature considered a bill that required physicians to
test newborns for drugs if they had reason to suspect the mother
used drugs during pregnancy.2 82 A positive drug test would have
been considered prima facie evidence that the newborn was abused,
and the Department of Social Services would have been able to peti-
tion the family court for relief.2" If the family court found that the
positive drug tests were accurate, it could order either Norplant or
sterilization.'
The apparent motivation for these measures is the protection of
unborn children from the adverse health consequences of drug use
by their mothers. Legislators thus share the concern of Judge
Broadman and others that pregnant addicts be prevented from in-
flicting drug-related injuries on their children. Yet, it is odd that
none of these measures authorize Norplant as a probation condition
for child abuse-especially since court orders of Norplant have all
been in response to child abuse. By focusing on prenatal conduct,
legislators may be attempting to accomplish through the legislature
that which has not been accomplished through the judiciary. By
punishing a woman for drug use while pregnant or for giving birth
to a child damaged by drugs, legislatures can punish prenatal be-
havior that cannot usually be treated as a crime. It may also be that
when forced to articulate the perceived connection between child
abuse and the procreative sanction of Norplant, the connection was
too tenuous (or sounded too politically risky) to make explicit.
Moreover, a bill punishing fertile female drug abusers but not male
would mandate Norplant for "drug-abusing women of childbearing age." Weintraub, supra
note 171, at A23.
277. Alan Guttmacher Institute Special Report, supra note 162, at 4; see also Mertus
& Heller, supra note 17, at 363.
278. Mertus & Heller, supra note 17, at 363.
279. Id.
280. Alan Guttmacher Institute Special Report, supra note 162, at 4.
281. Legislation and Litigation Involving Norplant, (Women's Legal Def. Fund,
Washington, D.C.), June 1992, at 1, 4.
282. Mertus & Heller, supra note 17, at 363.
283. Id.
284. Id.
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drug abusers is probably easier to justify when the "umbilical con-
nection"7 is the focus of attention. By contrast, it is more difficult to
put into statutory words an argument that the female child abuser
stands in a different relationship to the abused child than a male
child abuser."
b. Proposed Welfare Measures. Several state legislatures
have also considered measures to offer cash bonuses to fertile
women on public assistance who consent to implantation with
Norplant. Representative Patrick of Kansas introduced a bill
authorizing payment of five hundred dollars to women receiving Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) if they would agree to
Norplant implantation.287 The measure also provided that each
woman would receive an additional fifty dollars per year for every
year she kept the device in place.'
Similar bills were also introduced and ultimately rejected in
285. The theory under which some women have been prosecuted for prenatal child
abuse is that they "delivered" drugs to their fetuses via their umbilical cords. See gener-
ally Phillips, supra note 256, at 525-26.
286. Courts also seem to view female and male child abusers differently, as is evi-
dent from their reluctance to impose procreative punishments (by which I mean
punishments that implicate parts of the body involved in reproduction) on male child
abusers. Yet courts have turned to procreative penalties for male sex offenders, including
child molesters. See, e.g., Briley v. California, 564 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1977) (man pled
guilty to lesser charge of child molestation conditioned on consent to castration); People v.
Blankenship, 61 P.2d 352 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936) (man pled guilty to statutory rape and
was sentenced to probation conditioned on sterilization). In People v. Gauntlett 352
N.W.2d 310 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984), a man convicted of sexually abusing his step-daughter
was sentenced to "chemical castration" with depo-provera, a long-acting contraceptive
drug which has been used against male sex offenders to reduce their sex-drive. William
Green, Miscarriage of Justice, TRIAL, July 1991, at 61. The reviewing court in Gauntlett
disallowed the condition because it considered the drug experimental, and was concerned
about side effects. 352 N.W.2d at 316. Depo-provera was approved by the FDA for use as a
contraceptive for women in November of 1992. Felicity Barringer, Making Birth Control
Easier Raises Touchy Political Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1992, at 6.
287. Kan. H.B. 2089, 74th Leg., 2d Sess. (1991).
288. Id. The bill read:
[Tihe secretary of social and rehabilitation services shall establish a program to
make available the Norplant contraceptive implant, or another functionally
equivalent contraceptive which provides similar long-lasting pregnancy preven-
tion, which has been approved by the secretary for this program, to each public
assistance recipient who is able to become pregnant and who is receiving aid to
families with dependent children. Each such public assistance recipient who has
the Norplant contraceptive... implanted under this program shall be eligible to
receive under this program a special financial assistance grant in the amount of
$500 and a special annual financial assistance grant in the amount of $50 dur-
ing the period that the contraceptive remains implanted and continues to be ef-
fective in preventing pregnancy. The program shall provide for examinations by
health care providers to provide for the health and safety of public assistance
recipients who are to have the contraceptive implanted under the program.
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Louisiana, Texas and Tennessee. 8 9 When it was originally intro-
duced, the Tennessee bill closely resembled the Kansas bill; it was
subsequently amended two times.2 9 The first amendment modified
the bill to offer men receiving Medicaid five hundred dollars to un-
dergo a vasectomy.291 The second amendment substituted a five
hundred dollar scholarship for the five hundred dollar cash bonus.29 2
The amended bill passed in the House but died without approval at
the end of the session.293
The Mississippi Senate considered a bill that would have man-
dated Norplant, rather than "encouraged" its use via financial incen-
tives. 94 It required women with four or more children to be im-
planted with Norplant in order to qualify for or continue to be eligi-
ble for public assistance.295 Maryland's Governor recently indicated
that he would consider mandating Norplant as a precondition to
welfare receipt.296
The 1993 legislative session will usher in similar measures. A
bill introduced this year in the Florida senate would offer an increase
in AFDC payments to women implanted with Norplant.291 Tennessee298
and Washington2 99 will again consider Norplant legislation.
289. Alan Guttmacher Institute Special Report, supra note 162, at 3-4.
290. Id. at 3. The program envisioned by the bill was described as a "pilot project"
and was limited to the first five percent of participants. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 4.
295. Id.
296. Governor's Welfare Plan Pushes Free Birth Control, supra note 180, at 27.
297. Fla. S. 1886, 13th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (1993), available in LEXIS, Legis Library,
STTRCK File. The measure "provides that each recipient of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children is to receive $258 per month, or, if she has a Norplant implant, $400
per month." Id. This measure was sponsored by Senator Rick Dantzler. Id. At one time
Dantzler was considering making Norplant a prerequisite for public assistance. Jim Ash,
Gannett News Service, Jan. 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, GNS File.
298. Tenn. H.B. 1214, 98th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (1993), available in LEXIS,
Legis Library, STTRCK'File; Tenn. S. 407, 98th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (1993),
available in LEXIS, Legis Library, STTRCK File.
299. Wash. S. 5249, 53rd Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2(1) (1993). This bill provides that:
If a designated chemical dependency specialist receives information alleging
that a woman has given birth to a baby with fetal alcohol syndrome or addicted
to drugs, the designated chemical dependency specialist... may file a petition
with the superior or district court for the involuntary insertion of birth control
known as Norplant into the woman.
Id. The proposed bill also states that "[i]f after hearing all relevant evidence.., the court
finds that the mother has given birth to a baby with fetal alcohol syndrome or addicted to
drugs by clear, cogent, and convincing proof, it shall make an order to involuntary
insertion of Norplant into the mother." Id § 2(4). A woman implanted pursuant to this
bill would not be permitted to have Norplant removed "until six months after the court
finds she is clean and sober." Id. § 2(5).
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Like sterilization incentives, Norplant incentives may take dif-
ferent forms."° In 1993, for example, the Virginia legislature ap-
proved a plan to provide state health clinics with up to Six hundred
thousand dollars to implant Norplant in women who request it.301
While the program is meant to offer women the choice to use
Norplant, if, in order to qualify for funds, clinics have to demon-
strate that women are choosing Norplant, they may have an incen-
tive to persuade women to make that "choice."30 2
Recent efforts at welfare reform have focused on the welfare
mother.0 Several states have modified programs providing benefits
to women with children as a way to reduce welfare costs.30 4 A New
Jersey law that went into effect in the fall of 1992 reduces state and
federal welfare grants to single-mother families by denying them the
mnimumr increase per child formerly provided under the AFDC pro-
gram. 05 A Wisconsin plan set to go into effect in July of 1993 will
"curb" increased benefits to women who have additional children
while on welfare.3 0 6 California,30 7 Maryland3 8 and Arkansas30 9 have
considered similar action. According to one source, a bill introduced
in the Washington House would have denied welfare benefits to
children born after the application for assistance was made310 and a
300. See supra note 80 (discussing sterilization incentives).
301. Peter Baker, VA Assembly Approves Norplant Money Despite Critics, WASH.
PosT, Feb. 12, 1993, at Dl.
302. Some argue that "incentives are voluntary, since people can either choose to
accept them or refuse them if they want," but "[sluch views display a fundamental igno-
rance of the social context in which incentives are introduced." HARTMANN, supra note 80,
at 65.
303. See, e.g., Robert B. Gunnison, Clinton Tells Governors Experiment With Welfare;
President Says Federal Rules Will be Relaxed, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 3, 1993, at Al, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, SFCHRN File (noting that states will have increased flexibility
for reforming their welfare systems). See also, Williams, supra note 82, at 720 nn.4-8.
304. Martha F. Davis, War on Poverty, War on Women, N.Y. TIES, Aug. 3, 1991, at
19.
305. Gunnison, supra note 303.
306. Id.
307. Id. See also Legislative Proposals and Actions, 3 STATE REPROD. HEALTH
MONITOR (Alan Guttmacher Inst., Washington, D.C.), Dec.- 1992, at i, ix. Referring to the
proposed legislation to deny additional benefits for children born after the application for
assistance is made, Governor Wilson of California said it would "'end the insidious
incentive we are giving single mothers, especially teen-age girls, to continue having chil-
dren out of wedlock.'" Virginia Ellis, Wilson Testing Appeal of Tying Benefits to Behavior;
Prop. 165: Measure Would Bar Additional Funds for Mothers Who Have More Children
While Receiving Aid, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1992, at Al, A28 (quoting Governor Wilson).
308. John Frece, Maryland, Additional Welfare Benefits May Be Denied, BALT. SUN,
Feb. 24, 1992 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ABRPT File (discussing proposed
legislation); Legislative Proposals and Action, supra note 307, at ix (noting that the
Maryland legislature failed to approve the bill).
309. Legislative Proposals and Action, supra note 307, at ix.
310. Compassion Fatigue--Separating Tired Welfare Myths From the Facts, SEATrLE
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Senate bill would have offered women on welfare ten thousand dol-
lars to undergo sterilization.3 1'
c. Mapping the Myth. Much of the discussion of the Norplant
legislative measures, particularly those directed at the probation
and welfare contexts, resembles dialogues encountered earlier.
Kerry Patrick, who proposed the Kansas bills, declared:
The real question is, do we, as a society, since we're paying welfare to
these people, taking care of people who can't take care of themselves-is
our obligation in the reproductive area unlimited? And just like anything,
there's got to be some sort of limits. Why do we have an obligation as a
taxpayer for her to have two, three, four or five children, when we can
provide an incentive that would limit it? I mean, the taxpayers have
rights.3 12
Representative Patrick identifies the problem as one of "people"--
welfare mothers-who cannot take care of themselves; the proof of
the welfare mother's lack of self-control is her perceived reproduc-
tive conduct. Rhetoric about the legislative need to ensure fiscal
responsibility seems to be accompanied by the unstated goal of keep-
ing certain women from reproducing. Which women? Those that
keep irresponsibly having babies, those who are on welfare. The
underlying motivation for the Norplant bills is similar to that which
informed the eugenic measures designed to prevent women with
undesirable traits from reproducing: "The intense competition for
tax dollars has merely replaced genetic considerations with fiscal
and psychological ones."313
Targeting welfare mothers to reduce the tax burden is moti-
vated by the persistent but inaccurate notion that mothers on wel-
fare have more children in order to increase their welfare payments;
this has been called the "brood-sow myth."314 According to this para-
TIMEs, Feb. 4, 1992, at A6, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, SEATTM File.
311. Id.
312. 60 Minutes, supra note 222, at 10. Similarly, Senator Rick Dantzler of Florida,
who contemplated forcing women to be implanted with Norplant as a condition for receipt
of welfare benefits, stated: "I see us coming apart at the seams morally.... My con-
stituents are tired of paying for other people's irresponsibility. It's time for radical kind of
talk."' Ash, supra note 297 (quoting Sen. Rick Dantzler).
313. Monroe E. Price & Robert A. Burt, Sterilization, State Action and the Concept of
Consent, 1 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 57, 59-60 (1975). The authors note too that
[florms of state control and intervention change and become so sophisticated,
appealing, subtle, and delicate that modem governmental action seems to be
less and less restricted by an ordinary application of constitutional protections.
Ida at 59.
314. Paul J. Placek & Gerry E. Hendershot, Public Welfare and Family Planning: An
Empirical study of the "Brood Sow"Myth, 21 Soc. PROB. 658, 668 (1974). Dorothy Roberts
notes: "he myth of the Black Jezebel has been supplemented by the contemporary image
of the lazy welfare mother who breeds children at the expense of taxpayers in order to in-
752 [Vol. 41
19931 MOTHER/BODY MYTH 753
digm, women on welfare are out-of-control reproducers in need of
regulation. The Norplant bills reflect and perpetuate the image of
women on welfare as lacking self-control (perpetually pregnant) and
yet as repsonsible and culpable (calculatedly engaging in money-
making activities without regard for others). 15 While the formal
rationale for the Norplant-for-pay initiatives is that they will reduce
the welfare rolls by controlling the "brood-sow," research has refuted
the contention that women on welfare have children to increase
their payments. 16 Moreover, Norplant may actually put an addi-
tional strain on the welfare system. To qualify for the Norplant
payments one must be and stay on welfare. Statistically, however,
most welfare recipients do not remain on welfare for uninterrupted
or lengthy periods of time.317 Thus the allure of quick cash may ac-
crease the amount of her welfare check." Roberts, supra note 35, at 1444. See also
Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J.
1499, 1515 (1991) ("The cultural stereotype of the female-headed household receiving pub-
lic assistance has evolved from the image of the white widow to the image of the black
welfare mother.").
315. The common perception of welfare mothers is highly negative:
You give those lazy, shiftless good-for-nothings an inch and they'll take a mile.
You have to make it tougher on them. They're getting away with murder now.
You have to catch all those cheaters and put them to work or put them in jail.
Get them off the welfare rolls. rm tired of those niggers coming to our state to
get on welfare. rm tired of paying their bills just so they can sit around home
having babies, watching their color televisions, and driving cadillacs.
Roberts, supra note 35, at 1444 n.133 (quoting MILWAUKEE COUNTY WELFARE RIGHTS
ORG., WELFARE MOTHERS SPEAK OUT 72-92, 72 (1972)).
316. DOROTHY C. MILLER, WOMEN AND SOCIAL WELFARE 31 (1990) ("AFDC has no
impact upon the incidence of child-bearing among unmarried women) (citing DAVID T.
ELLWOOD & MARY JO BANE, THE IMPACT OF AFDC ON FAMILY STRUCTURE AND LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS 5, 6-7 (1985)); William A. Darity, Jr. & Samuel L. Myers, Jr., Does
Welfare Dependency Cause Female Headship? The Case of the Black Family, 46 J.
MARRIAGE & FAAM. 765, 773 (1984) (finding that 'itihe attractiviness of welfare and
welfare dependency exhibits [sic] no effects on black female family heads."); Placek &
Hendershot, supra note 314, at 668 (finding that welfare payments do not motivate
women to bear more children); Harriet B. Presser & Linda S. Salsberg, Public Assistance
and Early Family Formation: Is There a Pronatalist Effect? 23 SOC. PROB. 226, 230-31
(1975) (finding that mothers receiving AFDC were less likely to desire additional children
than mothers not receiving public assistance); Williams, supra note 82, at 739, 739 n.130
(citing studies finding no correlation found between child-bearing decisions-even the de-
cisions of young unmarried women-and receipt of AFDC benefits); Maxine Baca Zinn,
Family, Race, and Poverty in the Eighties, 14 SIGNS 856, 863-84 (1989) (citing studies that
refute the proposition that the payment of AFDC benefits "make it desirable to forgo mar-
riage and live on the dole"); but see CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL
POLICY 1950-1980, at 154-66 (1984) (arguing that the availability of assistance induces
women on AFDC to have multiple pregnancies).
317. SAR A. LEVITAN & CLIFFORD M. JOHNSON, BEYOND THE SAFETY NET: REVIVING
THE PROMISE OF OPPORTUNITY IN AMERICA 37 (1984) (discussing data from 1979 and
reporting that "nearly three of every ten AFDC families had received welfare benefits for
less than one year, and a majority of families had remained on the rolls for less than four
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tually increase a women's incentive to remain on welfare. Despite
the extant reasons to doubt the wisdom of the Norplant bills, even
taken on their own terms, such reasons seem to lack the power of
the prejudices and internalized images that gave rise to the bills.3 18
The Norplant bills targeting welfare mothers implicitly convey
the message that the State equates welfare mothers with bad moth-
ers, not unlike child abusers. State action targeting female welfare
recipients is punitive in a sense similar to a probation condition.
Such action represents an administrative judgment, similar to judi-
cial judgment, about a woman's maternal fitness. It has been noted
that "once the government involves itself deeply in the economic and
social life of its citizens.., the state is in a position to manipulate
its citizens as effectively by withholding largesse as by threatening
prison."319 The Norplant incentive scheme dispenses allocative sanc-
years. Fewer than 8 percent of all AFDC families had received assistance without
interruption for more than ten years."); Richard D. Coe, Welfare Dependency: Fact or
Myth, CHALLENGE, Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 43, 45 (finding that 48.8 percent of all welfare re-
cipients received welfare for only one or two of the ten year period covered by the study).
The population that would be affected by many of the Norplant measures, however, is the
population most at risk for long-term welfare dependency:. [n]ever-married women under
age 25 who begin receiving AFDC when their youngest child is less than three years old."
Miller, supra note 316, at 30.
It is speculative at best, however, whether the measures would have the influence on
behavior that their drafters intended. If there is no correlation between the number of
pregnancies a woman has and the availability of public assistance, see supra note 316,
would a disincentive to pregnancy appreciably affect the welfare rolls? Moreover, given
that much of the welfare population is only intermittently on welfare, a Norplant
measure offering money for every year the woman keeps the implant in-presumably for
at least five years and longer if a woman is implanted more than once-might encourage
women to remain on welfare when they might otherwise not.
318. See Williams, supra note 82, at 743 n.155 noting a 1990 study which reported
that "62% of whites thought African Americans tended to be lazy, while 54% thought
Hispanics likely to be lazy. Seventy-eight percent thought African Americans and 72%
thought Hispanics preferred to live off welfare." (citing TOM W. SMITH, NATIONAL OPINION
RESEARCH CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, ETHNIC IMAGES 9 (1990)). On debunking
welfare myths, see generally MARIAN WRIGHT EDELMAN, FAMILIES IN PERIL: AN AGENDA
FOR SOCIAL CHANGE 68-77 (1987); THEODORE R. MARIOR, AIERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD
WELFARE STATE: PERSISTENT MYTHS, ENDURING REAIITIE (1990).
319. Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1395-96 (1984). Kreimer examines "the question of
what conditional allocations may be said to be threats that reduce the autonomy guarded
by constitutional liberties, and, second, the question whether an allocation, be it threat or
offer, should be viewed as an impermissible effort by government to induce sale of
inalienable rights." Id. at 1396.
Similarly, Charles A. Reich observes:
If benefits necessary to the survival of the individual are the property of the
government then these benefits become an instrument of social control. The
government can impose conditions, supervise the behavior of the recipients, or
deny them the control over their lives that most other citizens are granted.
Charles A. Reich, Beyond the New Property: An Ecological View of Due Process, 56 BROOK.
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tions. It is fitting that the word "sanction" means- both penalty and
reward;32  while the rhetoric surrounding the welfare measures
maintains that women are "rewarded" for Norplant implantation
with cash bonuses, it could also be said that these women are being
"punished" for bad (irresponsible, out-of-control) reproductive behav-
ior.
Mothers on welfare, child abuse probationers and "feeble-
minded" women, form the skeleton of the "bad mother." The "bad
mother" is given shape by judges and legislators who draw on the
pool of "component characteristics." The presence of one "bad" com-
ponent is, as noted previously, considered a sign of the presence of
others. Thus drug use, irresponsibility, criminality, welfare receipt
and single motherhood are all interchangeable characteristics.2 '
The non-individuation of the woman on welfare and the child
abuser has. significant consequences. The female child abuser sen-
tenced to Norplant and the poor woman targeted by a Norplant bill
is each prevented from having children as punishment for perceived
abuse-either of their children or of the welfare system, or both.22
L. REV. 731, 738 (1990).
320. While sanctions are generally imagined as penalties, they can also assume the
form of a reward. Black's Law Dictionary defines "sanction" as:
A penalty or other mechanism of enforcement used to provide incentives for
obedience with the law or with rules or regulations. That part of a law which is
designed to secure enforcement by imposing a penalty for its violation or offer-
ing a reward for its observance.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1341 (6th ed. 1990).
321. See, e.g., Mertus & Heller, supra note 17, at 378 ("[S]terilization proposals of the
early 1920s had already grouped low income people with the feeble-minded insane and
criminal among the categories of socially inadequate for whom forced sterilization should
be permitted."); Ross, supra note 314, at 1505 n.19 (citing findings that poor people and
criminals have often been classified together); Fineman, supra note 151, at 283 ("Recently
poverty discourses emanating from a broad spectrum of groups, single mothers have been
lumped together with drug addicts, criminals, and other 'socially defined 'degenerates' in
the newly-coined category of the 'underclass.'"); Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal
Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871,
872-73 (1971) ("At common law, [clourts classified women with children and imbeciles,
denying their capacity to think and act as responsible adults and enclosing them in the
bonds of paternalism.").
322. Poor women are likely to be treated more harshly by the criminal justice sys-
tem. Clarice Feinman cites two studies both of which demonstrate that the criminal jus-
tice system is biased against poor, minority women. One study showed that "white women
who exhibit appropriate sex-role behavior" were accorded more "chivalrous treatment" by
law enforcement. Feinman, supra note 151, at 31 (citing Christy Visher, Gender, Police
Arrest Decisions, and Notions of Chivalry, CRBIINOLOGY, Feb. 1983, at 21, 22-23). The
other study found that "glower status women, those who are ex-offenders, those who are
economically disadvantaged, and especially those on welfare receive harsher sentences
than women who are employed, who work toward a goal such as fulfilling their duties as
wives and mothers, or students." Id. (citing Candace Kruttschnitt, Social Status and
Sentencing of Female Offenders, 15 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 256-59 (1980-81)).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
This conflation is sometimes made explicit; one Senator considering
introducing a Norplant bill stated: "Children born to single-parent
families, children reared without 'paternal influence,' are tomorrow's
criminals."3  This Comment reveals that single motherhood is
equated with welfare receipt, and that both are cues for criminality.
The public welfare laws of several states facilitate the blurring
of distinctions between individuals. To illustrate, the Kansas social
welfare code which established Kansas' welfare program is directed
at "all phases of dependency, defectiveness, delinquency and related
problems."324 As justification for their joint appearance, it might be
said that delinquency, deficiency and defectiveness are related
problems-that they can be found in a single individual. Yet the
failure of the law to make distinctions enables the perpetuation of
myths-for instance, the myth that people on welfare are
"delinquent." Here legislation facilitates a thought process similar to
that extant in the judicial opinions discussed earlier.
It is true that social welfare laws group dependents, defectives
and delinquents together as those "in need of assistance," and are
thus to be distinguished from laws employing similar classifications
for eugenic purposes. 15 But while there are significant differences
between these types of legislation, the eugenic sterilization laws
were also ostensibly enacted for the good of those subjected to them.
Given what has been "joined" historically, what characteristics are
likely to be perceived as fitting within the "related problems" lan-
guage of the Kansas Code? Recall that it was the Kansas legislature
that first considered a Norplant measure for welfare women, and
that that legislation was proposed as an Act under Kansas' Social
Welfare Code.
The characteristics the welfare context shares with the proba-
tion context make it an unsurprising arena for Norplant initiatives.
The welfare context allows for increased restrictions-welfare re-
cipients are already highly regulated. 26 Like probationers, welfare
323. Ash, supra note 297.
324. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-708c(t) (1986); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-
134(2)(7) (1988); ARm CODE ANN. § 20-76-201(b)(7) (Michie 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 346-
18(8) (Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 7 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
246.12 (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-1-3(K) (Michie 1992); TENN. CODE. ANN.
§ 71-1-105(7) (1987); but see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161:2 (1990) (where in 1979 the
legislature deleted the words "delinquent" and "defective").
325. Mertus & Heller, supra note 17, at 378.
326. For examples of cases which have considered the scope of conditions or limits a
state may impose on public assistance, see, e.g., Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970)
(holding that a state could not count as income money from the man with whom AFDC
recipient cohabitated if he had no legal obligation to make payments); King v. Smith, 392
U.S. 309 (1968) (holding that state could not disqualify woman from receiving AFDC be-
cause she cohabitated with man who was not obligated to pay child support); Dandridge v.
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recipients are in a poor bargaining position; they are asking for
something. Because the State is already giving out "hard-earned"
tax dollars, it feels it can ask for something in return, or attach
conditions to what it gives. Women thus situated are presented with
the choice of being implanted with Norplant, foregoing the extra
money, or, under some proposed plans, foregoing public assistance
altogether.
The rhetoric of choice was also deployed to defend the Norplant
probation condition; women could choose between probation and jail.
Judge Broadman said that Darlene Johnson chose Norplant. In re
Cavitt stated that the institutionalized woman could choose her
release or sterilization. 27 The rhetoric of choice is used to help ob-
scure the myths and rationales behind Norplant incentive schemes,
shifting the focus from cutting costs at the expense of a politically
marginalized group (this measure is meant to preserve tax dollars)
to a beneficent state protecting its vulnerable. As Judge Broadman
maintained, the Norplant condition would alleviate Johnson's stress
so that she could become a better mother.32 Representative Patrick's
defense of his incentive bill strikes a similar chord:
Why not try a program with an incentive? Why not give the welfare
woman a choice? Why not empower her to make the decision as to whether
or not she should use Norplant?... If... we can avoid the welfare recipi-
ent from having that second pregnancy, she can get the job skills, she can
get the education, then the Norplant is removed and she can be equipped
to take care of a child.3 29
Here "empowerment"-the liberating rhetoric of the women's and
civil rights movement-is coopted to wrest reproductive control from
disempowered women. What is freed, however, is not the woman on
welfare. What is freed are the resources of the State.
In sum, the Norplant measures reflect and perpetuate the "bad
mother" construction. Since what has been identified as reflecting
the bad behavior is the mothering, the Norplant measures' focus is
control of the expression of that "badness." Thus, Norplant is enlisted
to serve the myth that the "logical" avenue for controlling women's
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding constitutionality of cap on AFDC benefits for
large families, regardless of need); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987); Wyman v.
James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (holding that requirement that welfare recipient submit to
search of home as condition of receipt of benefits was not a violation of fourth amendment
rights). See also Ross, supra note 291, at 1518-26 (revealing the implicit moral
assumptions about poor people made by the Supreme Court in Dandridge and Wyman
among other cases). See also Coale, supra note 9, at 204-14 (arguing that the Norplant
bonus schemes constitute an unconstitutional condition).
327. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
328. Motion to Modify, supra note 181, at 21.
329. 60 Minutes, supra note 222, at 9-10.
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undesirable behavior is their reproductive capacity. This is achieved
through taking many small, each on its own seemingly insignificant,
steps. The woman who receives public assistance is associated with
"incompetents" and "criminals"-with irresponsibility. Evidence of
the welfare mother's irresponsibility is the reproductive behavior
that is perceived to impinge on the taxpayer. Thus conceived, reme-
dies enforcing procreative control take on the cast of rationality-the
punishment seems perfectly to fit the crime.
III. RETHINKING NORPLANT: THE DYSFUNCTION OF MYTH
For the 27-year-old Los Angeles woman, the offer was too tempting to
refuse: five years of contraception provided free of charge, with follow-up
health exams tossed in, too.... But shortly after the Filipino woman
agreed to have Norplant inserted in her arm as part of a doctor's training
session, she began to bleed heavily. Then her hair began to fall out and the
acne appeared. And when she called the hospital to have the capsules
removed, she was told it would cost $150 .... 'I was shocked. No one ever
told me it would cost to have it taken out,' said the woman, who still has
the capsules in her arm. 'No way I had that money. I live dollar to dollar.' 330
When a myth is perceived to be more fact than fiction, its pres-
ence may prevent different visions of reality from being voiced. 13 1
There is arguably much "fact" at the heart of the myths that inform
the Norplant measures and pervade the contexts this Comment has
discussed. It can be difficult to recognize that there are different ver-
sions of the truths ascribed to myths. This Part suggests that there
are other tales of the "reality" of Norplant that might be told.
A. Norplant's Health Risks and Lack of User Control
Norplant was tested on approximately fifty-five thousand
women in forty-four countries in clinical and pre-introduction trials
before it was approved for marketing in the United States.312 Also
330. Sally Jacobs, Norplant Draws Concerns Over Risks, Coercion, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 21, 1992, at 1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BGLOBE File.
331. Ruth Hubbard writes:
It is important to be aware that the ideology of woman's nature can differ dras-
tically from, and indeed be antithetical to, the realities of women's lives. In fact,
the ideology often serves as a smokescreen that obscures the ways women live
by making people (including women) look away from the realities or ask mis-
leading questions about them.
Ruth Hubbard, Social Effects of Some Contemporary Myths About Women, in WOMEN'S
NATURE: RATIONALIZATIONS OF INEQUALITY (Marian Lowe & Ruth Hubbard eds., 1983).
332. NORPLANT CONSUMER INFORMATION, supra note 166, at 3; U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT OF FERTILITY AND MATERNAL HEALTH DRUGS ADVISORY
COMMITEE MEETING, Apr. 27, 1989, at 132 [hereinafter ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING].
The first study of Norplant began in 1974, in Santiago, Chile. Id. at 91. It has recently
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prior to its approval, the Food and Drug Administration's Fertility
and Maternal Heath Drugs Advisory Committee convened for hear-
ings on Norplant's safety and effectiveness.3 3 Members -of the public
were invited to address the Committee. at its April 28, 1989 meeting,
and several organizations counseled against approving Norplant.3
Two concerns were frequently expressed: that the long term risks of
Norplant were not yet adequately known,335 and that Norplant's lack
of user control over the device presented potential problems if
women were not able to obtain prompt removal of the device.336
A representative of the National Women's Health Network
insisted that approval would be "premature"337 and urged: "Our pri-
mary concern is the lack of data on long term safety. Although we
are fully aware of how expensive it is to conduct clinical trials for 15
years or longer, we believe such studies should be carried out during
the pre-marketing phase, rather than post-marketing."3 8 Similarly,
Health Action International-U.S.A., an organization comprised of
consumer, environmental and women's health groups, recommended
that Norplant not be approved and advised that it be studied for at
least fifteen years in order to accumulate more safety data.3 9
In addition to Norplant's possible health risks-known and still
unknown-additional questions were raised concerning Norplant's
design and its lack of user control.340 The National Women's Health
Network noted that some reports from clinical trials indicated that
certain "women were not able to obtain prompt removal [of
Norplant] upon request."341 At least one woman who was refused her
request for removal of the device reportedly "cut the capsules out of
her own arm because she had no other choice."34' The concern was
voiced that if a woman was not able to have the capsules removed
after the five year period, she might face increased health risks. 43 In
been estimated that 1.8 million women world-wide use Norplant implants. Norplant Use
Increasing, Report Says, UPI, Jan. 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File
[hereinafter Norplant Use Increasing].
333. ADVISORY COMMEE MEETING, supra note 332.
334. See generally id. at 9-30.
335. See id. at 17, 20-21, 23.
336. See id. at 18, 21-22, 24-26.
337. Id. at 17.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 21.
340. Id. at 25 ("The greatest problem with Norplant is the complete loss of user
control.... "). The Committee was informed of reports that women in Bangladesh,
Sweden, Brazil and Ecuador were having difficulty getting Norplant removed. Id.
341. Id. at 18.
342. Id. at 25.
343. The Health Action International-U.SA also pointed out that Norplant's lack of
user control gave rise to several as yet unanswered questions and asked the Committee to
consider: "Do women always have access to providers with the necessary skills to insert
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short, a woman implanted with Norplant depends entirely on others'
willingness and competence to monitor and remove the device, and
past experience has shown that such benevolent treatment has not
always been forthcoming. A National Women's Health Network
spokesperson explained:
Many women, especially poorer women and women of color, who have had
difficulty obtaining high-quality responsive health care in the past, justi-
fiably are skeptical that the health and medical care system will suddenly
become reliable; i.e. that care givers actually will be trained adequately in
insertion and removal techniques as and that all requests for implant re-
movals will be immediately honored. 44
Despite the prevailing reservations about Norplant, the Advi-
sory Committee voted unanimously to approve Norplant for market-
ing in the United States.345 Not only were the fifteen year studies
some women's and health organizations thought imperative not
performed before approval, but the FDA also "hinted" that its test-
ing requirements would be "eased" because the costs of the ten-year
monkey studies and seven-year dog studies demanded by the FDA
were prohibitively expensive for the Population Council, Norplant's
sponsor.345
Since Norplant was approved, additional information has sug-
gested that the concerns over Norplant's safety and potential for
abuse were well-founded. While most of the published accounts in
and remove the rods?; What are the risks of ectopic pregnancy? And what are these risks
if the women do not have the rods removed after five years?" Id. at 21-22.
Women's fear of the removal procedure may also cause them to delay removal, per-
haps indefinitely. See Paolo Marangoni et al., Norplant Implants and the TCU 200 IUD: A
Comparative Study in Ecuador, 14 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 177, 180 (June-July 1983) ("In our
view, it would be wrong to be content with the low termination rate due to menstrual
problems. We believe that the rate would have been much higher if it had been easier to
remove the implants. In other words, there is a balance between distress caused by the
menstrual problems and the fear of the removal procedure.").
344. ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING, supra note 332, at 18; See also HARTMANN,
supra note 80, at 198 (predicting that in Third World countries women would have diffi-
culty obtaining prompt removal of Norplant).
345. ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING, supra note 332, at 183. After hearing from the
public, the Advisory Committee was presented with data from several clinical trials of
Norplant, and Norplant's safety and effectiveness were discussed. The Committee was
unanimous in pronouncing Norplant effective, id. at 164, finding that Norplant was "at
least as safe a contraceptive as the other hormonql contraceptives currently on the
market." Id. at 179-80. It determined that issues such as "bleeding, metabolic effects, and
ease of removal [had] been adequately addressed," id. at 180, and that there were "no
other safety issues.., which... need[edl to be resolved." Id. at 181.
346. Doug Podolsky & Marjory Roberts, Sorry, Not Sold in the U.S., U.S. NEWs &
WORLD REP., Dec. 24, 1990, at 65. For a description of the FDA approval process see
Stephen L. Isaacs & Renee Holt, Drug Regulation, Product Liability, and the
Contraceptive Crunch, 8 J. LEGAL MED. 533, 534-38 (1987).
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the United States report that women's reactions to Norplant have
been generally positive,37 there have been reports from other coun-
tries indicating that Norplant use may, in fact, produce long-term
and potentially fatal complications. According to Ines Smyth of
Oxford University, if it is not removed after five years, Norplant
creates a severe risk of ectopic pregnancy348 which can result in sud-
den death by massive internal hemorrhaging."' Human Defense
Network researchers, in interviews with fifty Norplant users, found
that forty-eight suffered from health-problems.3 50 A lawyer in
Sweden is reported to be representing twelve women allegedly in-
jured by the Norplant device.351
While FDA approval does not guarantee a product's safety, once
a product is FDA-approved it becomes cloaked with an assurance of
safety that may lead consumers to underestimate its risks.352 Other
347. See, e.g., Barbara Kantrowitz & Pat Wingert, The Norplant Debate, NEWSWEEK,
Feb. 15, 1993, at 37, 41; but see, Sarah E. Samuels & Mark D. Smith. Executive
Summary, in NORPLANT AND POOR WOMEN, supra note 17, at ix (noting that almost
twenty-five percent of American women implanted with Norplant have requested early
removal.)
348. An ectopic pregnancy occurs when the fertilized egg develops in the fallopian
tubes, rather than the uterus. THE NEW OUR BODIES OURSELVES, supra note 203, at 427.
Surgery must be performed before the tube ruptures. Id. at 210. The prescribing
information that accompanies the Norplant system kit notes that the rate of ectopic
pregnancies in women using Norplant has not been shown to be higher than in non-
contraceptive users, but acknowledges that the rate of ectopic pregnancy may increase
with the duration of Norplant use. NORPLANT PRESCRIBING INFORMATION, supra note 177.
349. Dave Todd, Expert Sounds Alarm on Indonesian Birth-control Program, THE
MONTREAL GAZETTE, Nov. 26, 1991 at Al available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, MONGAZ
File; see also Norplant Risks Played Down by Population Group, THE MONTREAL GAZETTE,
Nov. 27, 1991, at A16 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, MONGAZ File (spokesperson for
Population Council disputes that there is a severe risk of ectopic pregnancy).
Interestingly, this story, which appeared in several Canadian newspapers, was never, to
my knowledge, printed in a single United States paper. It is perhaps relevant that
Canada has not approved Norplant for domestic use. Id.
350. Brazilian Women Concerned Over Marketing of Norplant in United States,
Notimex Mexican News Service, Feb. 16, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
NOTMEX File. The text of that report stated that 3,500 Brazilian women used the
contraceptive experimentally from 1984 to 1986, at which time the Brazilian Health
Ministry suspended the experiment due to reports of complications and unpleasant side
-effects. Id. One woman who used Norplant in 1985 reportedly continues to experience
side effects. Id.
351. ADVISORY COmMIrEE MEETING, supra note 332, at 24.
352. See Judgment Proceedings, supra note 154, at 7 (Judge Broadman represented
Norplant's safety by telling Johnson that it was FDA approved and not experimental); See
generally NICOLE J. GRANT, THE SELLING OF CONTRACEPTION: THE DALKON SHIELD CASE,
SEXUALITY, AND WOMEN'S AUTONOMY (1992) (discussing the risks of various birth control
devices and providing evidence that frequently such devices are mistakenly thought to be
safer than they later turn out to be and documenting the frequency with which known
risks are not fully disclosed).
The government's ability, via the FDA, to release or not release, adequately test or
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FDA-approved products have later turned out to be defective and
injurious to the health of the women that use them. The injuries
sustained by women who received silicone breast. implants 5 3 and
who used the Dalkon Shield and the Intra-Uterine Device (IUD) are
illustrative.35 4
The anticipated Norplant removal problems are also occurring.
The research by the Human Defense Network disclosed that
"[wlomen's and health groups found that many doctors in the re-
search project did not examine patients thoroughly before implant-
ing Norplant, and abandoned the patients instead. of removing the
contraceptive after the experiment was concluded."3 5 One Norplant
implantee was told by her doctor that he would take out one of the
six capsules for seventy-five dollars, and that she would have to
return when she had the money to remove the rest. 6 A spokesper-
son from the Native-American Women's Health Education Resource
ignore health risks, gives it tremendous power over its citizens' health. See generally
BELINDA BENNETr, LEGAL NARRATIVES: FROM CoMsTOCKERY TO THE FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, 4 INST. LEGAL STUD. (1989) (critiquing drug regulation as a form of
paternalistic control over women as well as providing a feminist critique of regulatory
practices and failures illustrated by the Dalkon Shield, IUD and DES tragedies). In addi-
tion, the regulatory process is one to which most people do not have access, which allows
the government to make decisions without public scrutiny. Although the public is
sometimes given a chance to air its views, as in the Advisory Committee meetings on
Norplant, there are no rules about the weight that Committee must give to those views.
For a discussion of the role of the Advisory Committee in the FDA approval process, see
William Green, The Odyssey of Depo-Provera: Contraceptives, Carcinogenic Drugs, and
Risk Management Analyses, 42 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 567, 571 (1987).
353. See, e.g., Earl Lane, Conditional OK, Panel: Lift Ban on Breast Implants but
Restrict Use for Cosmetic Reasons, NEWSDAY, Feb. 21, 1992, at 4. "Only after a number of
women successfully sued breast implant manufacturers did the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration investigate the industry and ultimately warn the public of the dangers of
this product." Jane Tschida, Legal System Proves its Worth in Implant Scandal, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis), Feb. 26, 1992, at 13A
354. "According to Doris Haire, Chair of the Committee on Health Law and
Regulation of the National Women's Health Network, 'the power and the inclination of
the FDA to protect women is still very limited. The FDA still defines 'safe' as a relative
term, based on... what the FDA considers to be the acceptable potential risks and
benefits of the particular drug.' The FDA still relies on* manufacturers to submit data on
safety prior to the drug's approval. Once a drug is marketed, the FDA relies on
manufacturers and physicians-who have vested interests in avoiding liability for
injury-to report adverse reactions." GRANT, supra note 326, at 150; see generally
WOMEN'S HEALTH: READINGS ON SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ISSUES (Nancy
Worcester & Marianne Whatley eds., 1988); SUSAN PERRY & JIM DAWSON, NIGHTMARE:
WOMEN AND THE DALKON SHIELD (1985); Walter Lee McCombs & James F. Szaller, The
Intrauterine Device, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 247 (1975).
355. Brazilian Women Concerned Over Marketing of Norplant in United States,
supra note 324. See also Norplant Risks Played Down by Population Group, supra note
349 (spokesperson for Population Council concedes that Indonesian government has "been
slow to set up removal programs").
356. Jacobs, supra note 330. See also Samuels & Smith, supra note 347, at xi-xii.
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Center in South Dakota stated that "she has heard from dozens of
Native American women who say they were not advised about the
side effects associated with Norplant. And when some of them have
sought to have the capsules removed, their doctors discouraged them
or flat out refused."357 The Center has received one hundred calls
from Norplant users describing their experiences with the device,
and approximately one third of the calls concerned problems with re-
moval.5 8 The Center is considering filing a lawsuit over the device. 59
Lack of user control has enabled Norplant to be abused in some
countries, usually in the name of population control.. Indonesia, for
instance, imposes birth-control quotas, and punishes villages that
fail to meet them. 6 ' "Safaris" are conducted in which military and
public health officials sweep into villages and look for women to
implant with Norplant. 6' To compel compliance, Indonesian
authorities control access to goods and services such as "fertilizer
and agricultural facilities," and on Indonesia's tea plantations,
"women are denied work unless they have a registration card stating
that they have agreed not only to birth control, but a particular
kind, determined by the authorities."362 There have even been re-
ports of women coerced at gunpoint.36
While it may seem improbable that similarly coercive measures
would occur in the United States,3 64 government mandated popula-
357. Jacobs, supra note 330.
358. Id.
359. Id. The Director of the National Latina Health Organization in Oakland,
California said she has spoken with women "who felt pressured into using Norplant." Id.
360. Todd, supra note 349. See also Leah Makabenta, Indonesia: Population Success
Story has Shady Side, Inter Press Service, Nov. 5, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, IPS File.
361. Id. See also Arthur Caplan, The Norplant Safaris-Birth-Control Implant Leads
to Population Control by Governments, SEATTLE TIMES, July 7, 1991, at A13, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, SEATTM file.
362. Todd, supra note 349. See also HARTMANN, supra note 80, at 16-19, 234-37 for
documentation and discussion of coerced sterilizations in India, Brazil and Bangladesh.
363. Todd, supra note 349.
364. Ruth Dixon-Mueller describes U.S. international population policy in the 1960s
and 1970s as "driven by crisis." Ruth Dixon-Meuller, The Woman Question, 20 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L. L. & PoL. 143, 163 (1987). At this time, there was "overzealous recruitment" of
women to accept birth control, "sometimes leading to gross violations of the prindiples of
voluntarism and informed choice." Id. at 164. One might say that the current compulsion
to punish women, and to direct that punishment at their reproductivity, is a response to
our "crisis" situation with crime, drug abuse, and violence in families. This response to
today's problems is strikingly similar, both in form and motivation, to the abuses we hear
of in other countries, but think could never happen here. Dr. Sheldon J. Segal who helped
develop Norplant thought that it might be put to coercive and punitive use, but he was
"worrying about China, not California." Ellen Goodman, Birth Control--or Woman
Control?, NEWSDAY, Feb. 19, 1991, at 38, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWSDY
File.
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tion control illustrates the degree to which reproduction can serve as
a vehicle for social control.365 The above instances, as well as the
past experiences in this country," indicate that such fear is logical.
Norplant is also emblematic of the alienation of women from
the technology intended to liberate them. Some have argued that as
reproductive technology advanced during the 1960s, the medical
community became more involved in women's childbearing and indi-
vidual women lost some control over procreation.67 In particular, the
issues surrounding Norplant's lack of user control resemble issues
that surrounded the IUD in the 1960s. An early FDA report on the
device remarked:
Rebirth of interest in the intrauterine devices (IUDs) as an effective, ac-
ceptable method of contraception stems from two factors... [one of which]
is the suggestion that the underprivileged woman is more effectively
served when the need for recurrent motivation, required in most other
forms of contraception, is removed. 68
This passage illustrates the assumption that "underprivileged"
women are less likely to be "motivated," and thus are perfect candi-
dates for a birth control device that requires no user participation
365. For feminist'analyses of United States population control practices see, e.g.,
HARTMANN, supra note 80; Virginia Gray, Women: Victims or Beneficiaries of U.S.
Population Policy?, in POLITICAL ISSUES IN U.S. POPULATION POLICY 167-87 (Virginia
Gray & Elihu Bergman eds., 1974); Sandra Schwartz Tangri, A Feminist Perspective on
Some Ethical Issues in Population Programs, 1 SIGNS 895 (1976).
Coercive population control policies, like coerced contraception, have also come
under attack from those who fear that the government's aim in promoting such policies is
to commit racial genocide. See, e.g., THOMAS B. LITILEWOOD, THE POLITICS OF
POPULATION CONTROL 49-53, 69-87 (1977); J. Mayone Stycos, Some Minority Opinions on
Birth Control, in POPULATION POLICY AND ETHICS: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 169
(Robert K. Veatch ed., 1977).
366. See, e.g., supra notes 82-87 and infra notes 355-59 and accompanying text.
367. GRANT, supra note 352, at 10, 14. "As the control of health care passed from a
community of women to physicians and the state, autonomous control of procreative
power by women was increasingly eroded." Id. at 10; see also Datha Clapper Brack,
Displaced-The Midwife by the Male Physician, in BIOLOGICAL WOMAN-THE
CONVENIENT MYTH 207-09 (Ruth Hubbard et al. eds., 1982) (discussing the dominance of
the medical profession over childbirth); see generally GENA COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE
(1984) (arguing that much of reproductive technology serves to exploit women); but see
Stanworth, supra note 34, at 288-89 (cautioning that rejecting reproductive technology
because it represents the scientific communities' control over women's reproduction may
encourage women's realignment with nature-i.e., the nontechnological-an association
which has been detrimental to women).
368. GRANT, supra note 352, at 23 (quoting U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. ADVISORY
COMM. ON OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, Doc. No. 362-666-0-69-2, SECOND REPORT ON
ORAL CONTRACEPTIVES 13 (1969)). The report also indicates that the Committee believed
that the "use-effectiveness" of the IUD method of contraception was high because it re-
quired the least motivation and least control on the part of the woman. See id. at 23-24.
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once implanted. 6 9 Moreover, as with Norplant, some saw the IUD as
well-suited for "a government-financed scheme in which it was in a
woman's economic interest to have a device inserted and to keep it
there (or failing that, to have one re-inserted).... 3 7 0 This link of
implanting technology in women thought unable to control their own
reproduction with the association of poor women as particularly in
need of this control, was as evident with the IUD as it is with
Norplant.371
Presently, unknown health risks are "chosen" by women opting
for Norplant. While no contraceptive device is risk free,372 there are
alternative contraceptives available that pose fewer or none of
Norplanfs risks. Yet the rhetoric surrounding the Norplant device
sings its praises, with little if any discussion of risks beyond the type
of side effects to be expected with other hormonal contraceptives.
B. Rethinking the Norplant Measures
1. The Bad Mothers Revisited. "Examining legal issues from the
viewpoint of whom they affect most helps to uncover the real reasons
for state action and to explain the real harms that it causes."371
When myths about the nature of "bad mothers" are promulgated,
some arguably relevant aspects of the women are not mentioned and
parts of their stories are omitted-in the way that it was not made
clear at the time of her sterilization that Carrie Back's pregnancy
was the result of rape. 75 Debra Forster,376 for instance, came from an
369. See HARTMANN, supra note 80, at 167-68 (outlining "contraceptive biases"
including the bias towards funding hormonal methods of birth control, in large part be-
cause they "require little initiative by the user and minimal interaction between the user
and the provider"); Ferigna et al., supra note 261, at 59 ("Studies show that many doctors
assume poor women are not capable of using methods that require high user compliance,
such as oral contraceptives, despite the fact that such assumptions are not founded on
fact.") (citingPoor Women Good Pill Users, Study Finds, FAM. PLAN. DIGEST, 1972; 1(1):2).
370. CLIVE WOOD, INTRAUTERINE DEVICES 125 (1971).
371. Hartmann remarks: "The demographic objective is obvious in the very design of
the drug: It is effective for five or more years. One wonders why a one-or two-year option
was not developed first." HARTMANN, supra note 80, at 196. See also Barringer, supra
note 286, at 6 (quoting Julia Scott, Director of Public Education and Policy for National
Black Women's Health Project) ("Poor women, and disproportionately women of color, are
seen as less capable of controlling their fertility.'").
372. Julie DaVanzo et al., Health Consequences of Contraceptive Use and Reproduc-
tive Patterns, 265 JAMA 2692, 2695 (1991).
373. Brief of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists District IX and
Planned Parenthood Affiliates of California as Amici Curiae at 4, People v. Johnson, No.
29390 (Cal. Super. Ct. Tulare County 1990), appeal docketed, No. F015316 (Cal. Ct. App.
5th Dist. 1991) [hereinafter Brief of Amici].
374. Roberts, supra note 35, at 1423.
375. See supra note 67.
376. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
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abusive home,377 was raped by a stranger at age eleven, and had
abused cocaine and LSD since she was a teenager.3 78 She dropped
out of school in the seventh grade, and was married and had one
child by the age of fifteen.379 She had also tried to commit suicide
several times since the age of ten.380 Melody Baldwin,38 after being
sterilized, having given her son up for adoption, and having received
her sentence,382 also attempted suicide.3 3
There has been a suggestion that Cathy Knighten3: 4 suffered
from Munchausen's Syndrome by Proxy.3 8 Knighten had told police
that she felt burdened with her older children, aged -three and four,
and "hoped to keep her infant in the hospital."38 She also told them
she enjoyed the attention she received when her infant was ill.38 7
Kathy York Rodriguez, who pled guilty to child abuse and was sen-
tenced to ten years probation and forbidden to marry or conceive
during that time, was described by the court as having
"psychological and alcohol-induced problems .. .. "388 Williams was
physically and sexually abused as a child, and was also beaten by
her husband.3 9 Livingston, who was sentenced for child abuse to two
to five years probation with the condition that she not get pregnant
as punishment for child abuse, was described by the court as having
377. Creative Judges, supra note 15, at 1.
378. George Will, How Can a Judge Impose Birth Control? NEWSDAY, June 26, 1988,
at 10.
379. Creative Judges, supra note 15, at 1.
380. Id. A psychiatric evaluation ordered by the court disclosed that Forster was
"extremely self-centered, immature and irresponsible and unable to discharge her
parental duties." Id.
381. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
382. Rather than reviving the mandatory twenty-year term, Baldwin was sentenced
to ten years in prison. UPI, Nov. 19, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
Her suicide attempt occurred just days before the term was to begin. Id.
383. Id. This was not Baldwin's first attempt. Tybor, supra note 260, at 4 (Baldwin,
"an unmarried former $50-a-week waitress,... twice 'attempted suicide and, while
awaiting trial, injected urine into her breasts.").
384. See supra notes 199-204 and accompanying text.
385. Had the case gone to trial, Knighten's attorney apparently would have argued
that she suffered from Munchausen's Syndrome by Proxy. Rosenblum, supra note 17, at
276 n.5. Munchausen's Syndrome by Proxy is a term coined by Roy Meadow to "describe
parents who, by falsification, cause their children innumerable harmful hospital
procedures." Roy Meadow, Munchausen Syndrome By Proxy The Hinderland of Child
Abuse, LANCET, Aug. 13, 1977, at 343, 343.
386. Judge Orders Woman to be Given Contraceptive, supra note 186.
387. Id.
388. Rodriguez v. State, 378 So.2d 7, 8 (Fla. App. 1979).
389. Coyle, supra note 88, at 248.
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"an I.Q. substantially below 10O."M Truly assistance-minded pro-
grams would stress therapeutic intervention rather than punish-
ment.
3 91
Most likely to be affected by Norplant sentences are women
who are poor and of color. 92 It is estimated that as of January 1993,
five hundred thousand women in the United States have been im-
planted with Norplant;3 3 low-income women comprise a large per-
centage of this number, as Norplant is funded by Medicaid in all
fifty states and the District of Columbia.2 Some "truth" exists in the
390. State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335, 1336 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976). This case truly
suggests that court-ordered contraceptionlNorplant is the new eugenics.
391. Fortunately, in the past the approach to child abuse has been based upon a
belief that it is a social and psychological problem that deserves therapeutic and
non-punitive responses. However, as the therapeutic mechanisms break down
or prove inadequate, and society's demand for the amelioration of this social ill
becomes stronger, while program funding decreases, there may be a shift in
emphasis from concern for the individual to a concern for the children en masse.
Coyle, supra note 88, at 252; see also William L. Baker, Note, Castration of the Male Sex
Offender: A Legally Impermissible Alternative, 30 LOY. L. REV. 377, 378, 388-90 (1984)
(exploring whether castration is more appropriately characterized as a punishment or a
treatment for sex offenders, and concluding that "[tihe point at which castration exceeds
its function to accomplish the intended societal goal-the prevention of reoccurring illegal
sexual conduct-is the same point wherein treatment becomes punishment."). Id. at 389
(emphasis in original).
392. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 35, at 1421 n.6 (noting "[tihe disproportionate
prosecution of poor Black women" for exposing their fetuses to drugs). Poor women of
color are also more likely to be under "governmental supervision-through their
associations with public hospitals, welfare agencies, and probation officers." Id. at 1432.
Black women are more likely to be reported to government authorities by health care
workers. Id.; Scott, supra note 164, at 46 (noting that prosecutions for child abuse are in-
fluenced by race and citing a study that found that "black women were ten times more
likely than white women to be referred for prosecution for substance abuse while
pregnant). See also FEINWAN, supra note 151, at 27, 39-40 (noting that the major
determinants of crime by women are drugs and poverty). This may also be, as Dorothy
Roberts points out, attributable to the fact that poor women of color are "the least able to
conform to the white, middle-class standard of motherhood." Roberts, supra note 32, at
1422.
393. Norplant Use Increasing, supra note 332. According to this report, approxi-
mately fifty percent of Norplant users are married, and-seventy-five percent are younger
than thirty years old. Id. It has also been estimated that around the world 1.8 million
women use Norplant. Id.
394. Implant Gains Among Poor, supra note 12, at Al. According to one report
"roughly half" of Norplant users are on Medicaid. See Kantrowitz & Wingert, supra note
347, at 38 (citing Dr. Michael Policar, Planned Parenthood's vice president of medical af-
fairs). Another report states that sixty-one percent of Norplant sales have been to doctors
in private practice. Tom Bethell, Norplant is Welfare State's New Opiate; Contraceptive
Doesn't Address Causes of Illegitimate Births, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1992, at 5. A report
from Florida states that approximately eighty-five percent of women implanted with
Norplant in Florida were Medicaid patients. Florida: Norplant Making its Mark Among
Low-Income Women, American Political Network, Feb. 19, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, ABTRPT File.
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myths that surround Norplant measures. For instance, there is evi-
dence that "[w]omen are most likely to be poor when they are young,
unmarried, and if they are black or Hispanic."395  Similarly,
"[sitatistics consistently show that women... with lower family
incomes have high levels of unintended pregnancy than others, indi-
cating greater difficulty in meeting their childbearing goals." 9'
There was thus a factual basis for Judge Broadman's suspicion that
Darlene Johnson was on welfare and for the Dominguez and Zaring
courts' assertion that single mothers burden the welfare system.
The frequency with which these characteristics coexist probably
created the assumption that they always do,397 and that these char-
acteristics are part and parcel of the bad mother. The myth that the
characteristics must coexist represents an untruth that many of us
have internalized. The Norplant measures are evidence that our
judicial holdings and legislation are at times not a reasoned re-
sponse to the real lives of real people, but rather assaults on or de-
fenses of cultural constructions.
2. Context, Choice and Consent. While concerns about
Norplant's lack of user control were directed towards voluntary
Norplant use, they apply equally, if not with greater force, when the
decision to use Norplant is made in a coercive setting. In the welfare
and probation contexts, the decision whether to use Norplant is
more complicated than a choice among birth control alternatives;
food and liberty hang in the balance. As Elizabeth Mensch and Alan
Freeman have queried: "When does freedom bring coercion, and
One commentator remarked that funding Norplant via Medicaid is, in practical
effect, not that different from offering women incentives to use Norplant; Medicaid fund-
ing of Norplant could be seen as a racist attempt to curtail some women's fertility.
Bethell, supra.
It has also been observed that middle income women-whose incomes are too high to
qualify for medicaid but too low to cover the high cost of Norplant-are often unable to
obtain Norplant. Implant Gains Among Poor, supra note 12, at B12. In response to criti-
cism of Norplant's costs and the resulting inability of some women to obtain access to
Norplant, Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, Norplanes marketer, established a fund to provide
free Norplant kits to women not covered by Medicaid or private insurance. Id. Most re-
cently, the United States purchased Norplant to distribute to women not covered by
Medicaid, who otherwise could not afford the device. Norplant Purchased by US
Government, MARKETLETrER, Jan. 25, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI
File.
395. Forrest, supra note 271, at 22.
396. Id. at 21.
397. See Roberts, supra note 32, at 1424 ("Poor Black women have been selected for
punishment as a result of an inseparable condition of their gender, race, and economic
status. Their devaluation as mothers.., has its roots in the unique experience of slavery
and has been perpetuated by complex social forces.").
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when is coercion an instrument of freedom?" 98
Kansas Representative Kathleen Sibelius, commenting on
Representative Patrick's proposed bill to offer Norplant to welfare
mothers, remarked: "The idea of choice, I think, is removed, if you
have a starving person and you offer them food if they will do some-
thing. I don't think that's a very realistic choice. "3 1 It has been noted
that choice in the probation context is similarly limited: Patricia
Williams has written that the "vocabulary of allowance and option
seems meaningless in the context of an imprisoned defendant deal-
ing with a judge whose power is absolute.""0
Whether truly informed consent can be obtained in probation
contexts is thus doubtful.401 In such coercive contexts women may be
398. Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, The Politics of Virtue: Animals, Theology
and Abortion, 25 GA. L. REV. 923, 1126 (1991). See also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 101 (1987) (referring to Supreme Court's legalization of abortion,
and subsequent denial of public funding for abortion, MacKinnon wrote: "Preclude the al-
ternatives, then call the sole remaining option 'her choice.'").
399. 60 Minutes, supra note 222, at 9.
400. Patricia Williams describes the "choice" between sterilization and jail:
The defendant is positioned as a purchaser, as 'buying' her freedom by paying
the price of her womb. And because that womb is in the position of money in
this equivalence, it seems to many to be a form of expression, a voluntary and
willing expenditure in the commerce of free choice.
WILLIAS, supra note 263, at 32.
Williams, a law professor, recounts the class discussion of this issue:
'Why do you want to rob the defendant of his last little bit of freedom,' asks one
(student]. 'But the defendant chose the castration,' says another. I continue: It
is true that the transaction was structured as a contract. The power of that
structure, however, transforms the discourse from one of public obligation and
consensus into one of privatized economy. This positioning renders invisible the
force of the state, and invisible the enormous judicial whimsy exercised in the
selection of such a currency. It allows us to think that the state is not putting
the cut on its citizenry, it allows us to sustain the fiction, the half truth, that the
choice coming from the defendants own mouth. It is he who is begging to be
castrated.... The inversion of having the defendant beg to be dominated does
not make the state any less dominating.... What does seem to be obscured is
the fact that the state is creating a situation where it determines who shall
have children and who shall not....
Id. at 33-34.
401. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists District IX and
Planned Parenthood Affiliates of California filed an Amici Curiae brief in Johnson in
which they argued that the Norplant probation condition violated the law of informed
consent as well as usurped the patient/physician relationship. Brief of Amici, supra note
345, at 2-3. The brief maintained that the exchange between Judge Broadman and
Johnson failed to meet the criteria for informed consent, as Johnson was not apprised of
the risks and benefits of or alternatives to implantation with Norplant. Id. at 7. Moreover,
the Amici argued that given the disproportion of power between Judge Broadman and
Johnson and the fact that Johnson's liberty was at stake Johnson's consent could not
have been voluntary. Id. at 16-17. According to the brief, consent is coerced "when the pa-
tient is threatened, either explicitly or by implication, with unwanted consequences un-
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unlikely to make the same self-protective reproductive choices that
they might otherwise make. Even in a non-coercive environment, the
necessarily uninformed choice to use potentially harmful drugs is a
difficult one, and women will often choose not to assume the risk.0 2
In the probation context, the question of whether Norplant use
would be advisable for a given woman-a question no judge is quali-
fied to answer-is likely to be distorted or neglected. Judge
Broadman directed Darlene Johnson to "tell" the doctors that she
was "supposed" to get the implant.40 3 How will this affect the treat-
ment she receives? Might the doctors screen her, less carefully?
Might Johnson respond to her doctor's questions so as to encourage
him or her to approve the implantation, because she wants desper-
ately to avoid jail? Similarly, what if, after being implanted, a proba-
tioner needed Norplant removed because of a medical reaction-
would she need to consult to court for permission to have Norplant
removed? Is that likely to occur quickly? A probationer might also
avoid seeking medical assistance for complications ensuing from
Norplant, due to fear that removal might lead to incarceration for
failure to satisfy the probationary terms.
The woman on welfare implanted with Norplant as part of a
Norplant incentive scheme would face similar problems. Women
who receive implants and then drift out of the welfare system may
not have the devices removed, increasing their chances of incurring
health risks.40 4 As this Comment suggested earlier, equally as trou-
less the patient accede[s] to a specified course of action. The concern about coercion is the
greatest when a disproportion in power between the patient and another individual lends
credibility to the threat of harm." Id. at 16-17 (citing PRESIDENT'S COMA'N FOR THE STUDY
OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. & BIOMEDICAL. & BEHAVIORAL RES., MAKING HEALTH
CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE
PATIENT-PRACTIIONER RELATIONSHIP 65 (1982)).
The State of California, the respondents in People v. Johnson, conceded that Judge
Broadman failed to get Johnson's informed consent and agreed that the Norplant
condition as imposed was invalid. Respondents Supplemental Brief, supra note 237, at 2.
402. The fear of injury, the need to protect oneself and one's child, serves as a
powerful disincentive to women to use a new possibly more effective (possibly
even safer but how would you know?) contraceptive or drug to assist with preg-
nancy complications. This fear, and the limitation of options it imposes on
women, serves to control the private practices of women's sexuality.
Bennett, supra note 352, at 116-17.
403. Judge Broadman directed Johnson to return to him five months after sentenc-
ing for a hearing to demonstrate her compliance with the probationary terms. Judgment
Proceedings, supra note 154, at 10. In the interim, Johnson was to contact the doctors at
the health center and tell them: "you want this and that you're there to get this thing
done." Id. at 10.
404. The American Medical Association issued a report condemning coerced use of
lNorplant-via court-order or incentive schemes. Long-Acting Contraceptives, supra note
17.
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bling a thought is whether women who receive the implants and
then change their minds will be granted removal upon request.
Doctors may feel the women are "better off" with the.devices in, and
dissuade them from removal or simply refuse to perform the service.
-Several ironies inhere in Norplant measures. Norplant was
purportedly created in order to give women greater opportunities for
controlling their own fertility, not for purposes of coercion.4 5 Yet
Norplant is being used in order to give the State more control over
certain citizens. Second, rather than being an additional birth con-
trol option offering women increased autonomy, Norplant's lack of
user control enables it to be used to remove as much or more of a
woman's control over her reproduction as it gives. 406 It is also ironic
that Norplant-a contraceptive device that, once implanted, cannot
be controlled by its user-is being pushed via the Norplant meas-
ures as a means of offering child abusers and welfare mothers an
opportunity to regain control over their lives. In fact, in imposing
such external control, the State takes away women's control. The
State thus perpetuates the condition it ostensibly aims to "treat."
These ironies are magnified when Norplant is considered in the
probation and welfare contexts. One of the goals of the welfare sys-
tem is to assist people in regaining control of their lives. Similarly,
one of the goals of probation is to rehabilitate the defendant. Yet
from one perspective the Norplant measures actually remove the
opportunity for Norplant users to be independent and self-sufficient.
This creates precisely the same dependence on the State that
Norplant was presumably designed to sever.
Women may have babies not because, as the myth goes, the
State gives them more money, but because it makes them feel that
there is something constructive they can do.407 Women may hit their
405. See Marilyn Gardner, Birth Control By Law, CHRISTIAN SO. MONITOR, Jan. 15,
1991, at 5 (quoting Sheldon Segal, developer of Norplant, as being "totally and unalter-
ably opposed" to coercive use of Norplant).
406. In an interesting exchange between Johnson and Judge Broadman, the Judge
expressed his view that, once developed, the manufacturers of Norplant could no longer
control the use to which it was put. Judge Broadman questioned the weight to be given
the statements of a scientist who had studied Norplant and advised against its use in a
coercive environment, drawing a parallel to a scientist telling President Truman whether
or not to drop the atomic bomb. Motion to Modify, supra note 181, at 6. Johnson's
attorney responded, "I suppose once the product is developed, then it's in the market and
it's really up to whoever [sic] has control of it to decide how its going to be used." Id. at 7.
407. They say no, no, no, no more kids. The welfare worker, she tells you you're
overpopulating the world, and something has to be done. But right now one of
the few times I feel good is when I'm pregnant, and I can feel I'm getting some-
where. At least then I am, because I am making something grow, and not seeing
everything die around me, like all the time it does in the street, I'll tell you.
They want to give me the pill and stop the kids, and I'm willing for the most
part. But I wish I could take care of all the kids I could have, and then I'd want
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children because of their sense of their own powerlessness: 'Power-
less women have always used mothering as a channel-narrow but
deep-for their own human will to power, their need to return upon
the world what it has visited on them."0 8 Thus, the Norplant meas-
ures may not even address the reproductive behavior that is their
focus.
Ascribing to it the best intentions possible, it might be said that
in mandating Norplant via the judiciary and legislature, the State
wishes to send a message about irresponsible behavior, about rash
actions and violence towards those less powerful than oneself. This
is admittedly a valid governmental objective. Yet, the Norplant
measures actually serve to perpetuate the conditions that allegedly
make them necessary. By removing women's control of their mater-
nal bodies, the State sustains the myth that women are out-of-con-
trol and in need of externally imposed control. The Norplant meas-
ures represent a reaction to and a safeguarding of the tradition that,
when faced with a whole woman, sees only her capacity for mother-
hood. That capacity then becomes the focus of State efforts to regu-
late the woman. The Norplant measures thus perpetuate the
mother/body myth.
CONCLUSION
[Tihe way the story is told is the story itself.40 9
However one might distinguish them from the policies of the
past, the Norplant measures express similar attitudes. The same
myths surround both of them. These judicial and legislative propos-
als reflect and reenact myths about women who mistreat their chil-
dren, poor women, single mothers, and welfare recipients. Addition-
ally, and perhaps even more damaging, they legitimate a way of
thinking.
Judges and legislators inevitably draw upon myths, and as part
of the formal voice of the State, they legitimize them. When they
draft opinions or statues, judges and legislators write themselves
plenty of them. Or maybe I wouldn't. I wouldn't have to be pregnant to feel
some hope about things. I don't know, you can look at it both ways, I guess.
ROBERT COLES, 3 CHILDREN OF CRISIS: THE SOUTH GOES NORTH, 594-95 (1967) (Robert
Coles presented this passage in poem form; I have rearranged it into prose). See also
LEON DASH, WHEN CHILDREN WANT CHILDREN (1989). Dash interviewed pregnant teen-
agers in Washington D.C. and learned that they have diverse reasons for wanting
children. As one interviewee stated: "Girls out here know all about birth control. There's
too many birth control pills out here. All of them know about it.... Girls out here get
pregnant because they want to have babies." Id. at 11.
408. RICH, supra note 22, at 20.
409. Louis MARIN, UTOPIQUES: JEAUX D'ESPACES 151 (1973) ('ia fagon de raconter
l'histoire constitue lhistoire elle-meme.").
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and their culture into the law. Yet they have a choice as to how they
proceed; they may choose to camouflage the myths upon which they
rely, blending them into the legal landscape, or to unravel, expose
and account for myths.41°
By this process the myths that create, inform and destroy, si-
lently acquire legal weight. They become real. When the myths are
not identified or made explicit-more precisely, when the role they
play in the decisional process is not anywhere visible-they are
perpetuated. In order to counteract this process, or at least fully
gauge its impact, we must be aware of its occurrence. The often in-
distinct line between the fact and fiction in myth makes this a par-
ticularly difficult challenge; myths, particularly to those inclined to
promulgate them, have the ring of truth.4 ' Judges and legislators
are able to silently perpetuate the thinking that underlies their legal
reasoning. They are able to do this because we share many of the
same assumptions; we participate in the telling of myths.412 We often
come to accept something as true without realizing how our collec-
tive reinforcement gave it much of its meaning.
413
410. I do not intend to suggest that judges unravel the fabric of their opinions, only
that they take care to identify the threads they choose in creating their design.
411. See Rutherford, supra note 3, at 99 ("Myths only seem fictional to outsiders.
Insiders view myths as true.").
412. See Ross, supra note 314, at 1513:
Legal rhetoric embodies dominant cultural assumptions. When judges construct
their arguments, they must depend on assumptions widely shared by their
audience. Judges depend on these assumptions both because they give their ar-
guments power and the potential for influence, and because judges, as members
of the culture, are likely to believe them.
413. In observing that Americans share a history of racism, and that each of us holds
racists beliefs, often on an unconscious level, Professor Charles Lawrence writes that
such unconscious racist beliefs,
are so much a part of the culture, they are not experienced as explicit lessons.
Instead, they seem part of the individual's rational ordering of her perceptions
of the world. The individual is unaware, for example, that the ubiquitous pres-
ence of a cultural stereotype has influenced her perception that blacks are lazy
or unintelligent. Because racism is so deeply ingrained in our culture, it is likely
to be transmitted by tacit understandings.
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323 (1987). Ross makes a similar point:
In its assertion or suggestion of the difference and deviance of the poor, the
rhetoric of poverty is both revealing and obscuring. The rhetoric reveals the re-
ality of criminal and immoral behavior among the poor. The rich are not the
only ones who defraud the government and abuse their children. At the same
time, the rhetoric of poverty obscures the aspects of poverty that reflect our own
lives.
The Court's arguments in the poverty cases are much more than 'rhetorical
forms. They are a lens through which we see poverty. Once we accept the rheto-
ric's depiction of poverty, we are done, the answer to the legal question is or-
dained. For example, if we see the AFDC mother as different, prone to child
774 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41
The law does not encourage revelation of thought process-at
best it offers tools for disputing results. Even if a judge were to make
a comment in court or in an opinion, revealing the myths to which
he or she subscribes, her comment would likely be criticized,414 and
her decision might even be questioned, 41 but the underlying proc-
ess-the means and myths by which he or she got from the present-
ing problem to the final outcome-would not be reached.416 And
consider how often the same process occurs without any 'revealing
comment, or is signaled but in language that would not be grounds
abuse, and an ungrateful recipient of public largesse, the legal issue of whether
the government can demand home visits seems easily answered. By contrast, if
we see [the AFDC mother] as like us, a mother struggling to hold her family to-
gether and keep a sense of personal dignity through it all, the legal issue be-
comes more problematic.
The rhetoric of poverty invites the reader to provide a part of the picture,
to bring to the reading culturally taught, stereotypical assumptions about the
poor.
Ross, supra note 314, at 1541-42. Ross maintains that the power of such rhetoric derives
from its leaving its underlying assumptions implicit; the reader must make the
connecting leap. If the assumptions were made explicit the reader might be uncomfort-
able and reject them. Id. at 1542.
414. The appellate court in People v. Zaring, for example, reversed Judge
Broadman's most recent probation condition against pregnancy and rebuked Judge
Broadman for letting his personal values infiltrate the case. 8 Cal. App. 4th 362 (Ct. App.
1992). In that case Judge Broadman did make his assumptions explicit when he said: "I
want make [sic] to make it clear that one of the reasons I am making this order is... ".
Id. at 368. Yet the court did not reflect on why Judge Broadman might have come to the
decision he did. The appellate court wrote: "[We are constrained by our oath to refrain
from imposing our personal views on people brought before the bench. It is the law which
must guide our actions and not our preferences or inclinations." Id. at 372. Judge
Broadman, however, probably believed he was being guided by the law; he may have be-
lieved, because of the thought process by which he arrived at the conclusion that such an
order was necessary, that the condition did meet the criteria imposed by law.
415. A judge might be reprimanded or suspended by an ethics committee, for in-
stance. A Wisconsin judge was suspended for two years as a result of racially charged re-
marks not dissimilar from those made by Judge Broadman in Zaring. See In re
Gorenstein, 434 N.W.2d 603 (Wis. 1989). The judge in that case "berated black women
with minor children appearing before him on probation status reviews for what he viewed
as a wholesale abuse of the welfare system in Milwauked by blacks who had illegitimate
children and did not want to work." Id. The judge had remarked:
I am sick and tired of supporting people. Seventy-five percent of the black peo-
ple in Milwaukee are illegitimate. This woman has three illegitimate kids. I
don't want to support her kids.... Seventy-five to eighty percent... of the peo-
ple I see in court are born illegitimate and black and come from welfare fami-
lies; and I pay for this courtroom and the staff and I am sick of it and so is the
rest of Wisconsin.
Id. at 604-05.
416. Similarly, if a legislator sponsoring a bill were to identify the underlying as-
sumptions that motivated its particular construction, and then publicly declare them, his
or her constituents could only vote their approval or disapproval of the bill or the
legislator, but not the process.
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for reversal of the opinion or censure of the judge.4 17 In addition,
leaving criticism to others abdicates responsibility each of us should
assume.
418
The problem is not so much that judges bring their own moral-
ity to opinion writing; judging inevitably involves some level of
subjectivism. 419 Rather, the danger lies in the extent to which that
subjectivity is not recognized for what it is-and worse-is ascribed
a greater, mythic truth. The cases and legislation considered herein
demonstrate the consequences that can attend this phenomenon.
Acknowledging and coming to terms with some of the myths in
which we put stock would be a first step towards counteracting this
process.420 Given the propensity for bias, the movement to counteract
that bias must be intentional and deliberate.42 Each of us, judges
and legislators included, should be forced to confront our prejudices
417. One wonders whether if Judge Broadman in Zaring had not said almost exactly
what the sentencing judge in Dominguez said, whether the appellate court reviewing the
probation condition barring pregnancy would still have inferred that Judge Broadman
was "imposing [his] personal views" simply from the fact that he imposed such an order.
When language is more veiled, it is less likely to be found objectionable, although the
accompanying action may still be challenged. In State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313 (Kan.
App. 1989), a court reviewing and reversing the trial court's probation condition
prohibiting pregnancy for a woman who pled guilty to child endangerment remarked:
"Although the trial court stated that it had 'no sympathy for someone that would cast a
newborn upon the mercy of strangers,' there is no evidence of bias or personal prejudice
against Mosburg." Id. at 316. It could be argued, by contrast, that the no pregnancy condi-
tion was itself evidence of bias or personal prejudice, but that the absence of language
linking the condition with attitudes about the woman affected (present in Zaring and
Dominguez) may have prevented the reviewing court from reaching that conclusion.
418. Martha Minow expressed this sentiment in this way- "Writing not just for
judges, but for all who judge, I mean to invoke a broad array of people in the exploration
of justice." Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term-Foreword; Justice
Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 15 (1987).
419. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges
Avoid Serious Moral Error? 69 TF_. L. REV. 1929 (1991). These authors discuss some of
the "moral errors" made by judges, such as in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) and
contemplate whether the judges might have avoided error by reading "counternarratives"
that would have challenged their conceptions about the World. In considering why such
moral misjudgments occur, the authors write:
One obvious explanation for these mistakes is judicial inability to identify,
imaginatively, with the persons whose fate is being decided. Because of the par-
ticularized stock of life experiences and understandings judges bring to the
bench, these notorious opinions seemed to their authors unexceptionable, natu-
ral, 'the truth.'
Id. at 1930.
420. See Lawrence, supra note 413, at 380; Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 391, at
1954.
421. See generally BERNARD L. SHIENTAG, THE PERSONALITY OF THE JuDGE 48-56
(1944) (arguing that it is essential for judges to recognize the virtual impossibility of at-
taining pure impartiality).
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and to make them clear.422 Judges and legislators, because of the
power they have to enforce myths and their duty to serve the public,
have a particular responsibility to "articulate their latest under-
standing of what we share."4"
The range of women targeted for State-encouraged Norplant
implantation is growing. Proposals are being directed not only at
women on welfare and at certain female probationers, but also at
girls considered at high risk for pregnancy424 and, most recently, at
all high school girls over the age of twelve.425 New measures con-
422. Lawrence, supra note 413, at 380; see also SHIENTAG, supra note 393, at 63
(quoting MORRIS R. COHEN, REASON AND NATURE 81 (1931) ("'[T]he hampering effect of
narrow prejudice or prejudgment is reduced... by logical analysis or reflection, which, by
making our premises explicit, shows them to be a part of the larger number of possible
assumptions.'"); Minow, supra note 418, at 16 ("I urge the judiciary to make a perpetual
commitment to approach questions of difference by seeking out unstated assumptions
about difference and typically unheard points of view.").
423. Lawrence, supra note 413, at 386; see also Minow, supra note 418, at 15:
Once we see that any point of view, including one's own, is a point of view, we
will realize that every difference we see is seen in relation to something already
assumed as the starting point. Then we can expose for debate what the starting
points should be. The task for judges is to identify vantage points, to learn how
to adopt contrasting vantage points, and to decide which vantage points to em-
brace in given circumstances.
424. See Tamar Lewin, Baltimore School Clinics to Offer Birth Control by Surgical
Implant, N.Y. TImES, Dec. 4, 1992, at Al (reporting that clinics in Baltimore schools will
provide students with Norplant); see also Tracey Kaplan & John Johnson, Birth Control
Implants at Valley School Defended, L. TIMEs, Mar. 26, 1993, at A5 (reporting that a
school-based clinic in San Fernando, California offers Norplant).
425. Shortly after Norplant because available a radio talk-show caller suggested that
"every girl should have it stuck in her arm at puberty." Goodman, supra note 364.
Variations on this proposal have been advanced somewhat more delicately since. A West
Virginia judge recently proposed that a twelve-year old be paid $500.00 to be implanted
with Norplant, and $150.00 thereafter, presumably for as long as the contraceptive re-
mained in place. Marilyn Gardner, Paying Teenagers Not to Have Babies?, THE CHRISTIAN
Sci. MoNrrOR, Jan. 14, 1993, at 14. Similarly, a Professor at Penn State University
proposed a system he described as a "future-oriented deferred gratification system'" in
which,
"[bleginning in the seventh grade.. .'[elvery four, six, or nine months, all fe-
male students could get a visual and hand-across-the-tummy-examination to de-
termine whether or not they're pregnant. If not, they would receive a payment,
perhaps $25.00, with a matching payment going into an escrow account.' Every
time they came in, the payment would be increased... as would the matching
escrow payment."
Id. Norplant has not been tested on teenagers. Charlotte Allen, Norplant-Birth Control
or Coercion?, WALL ST. J. Sept. 13, 1991, at A10.
The idea of paying teens not to get pregnant predates Norplant. In Denver in 1985 a
program "designed to prevent second pregnancies among teenagers who have already
been pregnant before the age of 16" went into effect. The Dollar-a-Day program teenage
women attend a weekly meeting with counselors at the end of which they are paid seven
dollars. See Nancy Kates, Buying Time: The Dollar-a-Day Program, in GENDER & PUBLIC
POLICY 282 (Kenneth Winston & Mary Jo Bane eds., 1993).
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tinue to be proposed.426 The time to reexamine Norplant, and the
myths we create and perpetuate, is now.
426. Legislators in states where Norplant bills have previously been rejected are
optimistic that they will pass this term. See Kantrowitz & Wingert, supra note 347, at 38
(reporting that Mississippi Senator Walter Graham thinks a bill requiring women with
four or more children to be implanted with Norplant in order to qualify for public
assistance will "eventually be approved"). In suggesting that Norplant might be made
mandatory for some women on welfare, Governor Schaefer of Maryland stated: "We may
be forced to make mothers take care of themselves." Id. at 37.
7771993]

